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INDEX FUNDS AND SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION
Richard A. Booth*
Most legal scholars agree that securities fraud class actions do little good
for investors. Aost investors are well diversified and thus are just as likely to
sell an overpriced stock as to buy one. Moreover, since the defendant company
ultimately pays in a successful class action, holders effectively pay buyers.
Although this circularity is widely recognized, few have noted that because of the
anticipatedpavout, the prospect of a class action causes stock price to decline by
more than it otherwise would, thus generating additional feedback loss for both
buyers and holders. In this 4rticle, I describe a method by which one can
measure the net effect of class actions on fund investors who are both buyers and
holders of afraud-affected stock. Since an index fund almost always holds more
shares than it buys during the fraud period, an index fund almost always loses
more than it gains. Thus, class actions systematically penalize rational index
fund investors for the benefit of irrational and undiversfied stock-picking
investors. Accordingly, index funds should oppose class actions as contrary to
the best interests of investors. To be sure, one possible problem is that in the
absence of the deterrent effect of class actions, there might be more securities
fraud. The answer is that whenever there is a meritorious class claim, the
corporation itself will also have a claim against the individual wrongdoers for
any increase in the cost of capital resulting from reputational harm and any
direct expenses relating to enforcement proceedings. In a class action, these
elements of loss are imbedded in the price decrease that occurs when the faud is
discovered. But these losses are in fact suffered by the corporation and should
be the subject of a derivative action for the benefit of the corporation and thus
all of the stockholders-rather than a class action for the benefit only of those
who bought shares during the fraud period. Although the corporation's claim
may be smaller than the class claim in the aggregate, it is likely to be quite
substantial from the point of view of individual wrongdoers, thus constituting a
significant deterrent to fraud Happily, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provide a fix for the problem. First, a claim that can be handled as a derivative
claim must be handled as such and must be resolved first before any class claim
may be addressed. Second, no class action may proceed unless the court
certifies it as a proper class action. No action may be so certified if there is any
other equally good way to litigate the issues-such as by means of a derivative
action. But someone must first make the argument. It is puzzling that no one has
done so, especially because derivative actions eliminate feedback losses and
serve to restore stock price. There are several possible explanations. One is
that insurance does not cover derivative claims as it does class claims.
Moreover, directors and officers who are likely to be defendants in a derivative
action may preftr to circle the wagons and present a unified defnse together
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with the corporation in the context of a class action. Another factor militating
against derivative actions is that aggregate attorney ftes are likely to be higher
in class actions than in derivative actions, which may incline plaintiff lawyers to
favor class actions even though investors would be better served by derivative
actions. On the other hand, until now, no one has quantified the costs and
benefits of class actions for real-world investors. Since index funds almost
always lose more than they gain, they should oppose class actions and favor
derivative actions. Indeed, index flnds owe a duty to their investors to do so.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the typical securities fraud class action arising under Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule l0b-5, the plaintiff class consists of
investors who buy a stock when the price is allegedly inflated because of a false
I. Rule IOb-5 is codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2012).
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statement by the issuer corporation.2 When the truth comes out, the stock price
drops. Under federal law, buyers have a claim against the issuer company for
the difference between the price they paid during the fraud period and the price
at which the stock ultimately settles after corrective disclosure.
One would think that investors should be happy that the legal system affords
them a remedy for their losses. But one would be wrong. Although some
investors may see securities fraud class actions as an important source of
protection, diversified investors should regard such lawsuits as nothing more
than an unnecessary tax on returns. First, since investors who sell a stock when
it is overpriced keep their gains and since a diversified investor is just as likely to
sell as to buy. gains and losses wash out over time. So. diversified investors
have no need for a class action remedy. Second, class actions ultimately cause
bigger losses for nontraders-mere holders-than they would otherwise suffer.7
Because the defendant company pays, stock price declines by more than it
2. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 597 F.3d 330
334 (5th Cir. 2010). vacated sub non. Erica P. John Fund. Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179,
2187 (2011): see also Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657. 662 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing
Nathenson v. Zonagen I nc., 267 F.3d 400, 415 (5th Cir. 2001)) (noting that the plaintiff must allege
and present evidence that a false, non-confirmatory positive statement positively affected the stock
price). The focus here is on securities fraud involving outstanding stock and not fraud involving the
sale of stock by the issuer in a public offering. The latter is governed by the Securities Act of 1933
(1933 Act), under which the remedy is essentially one of disgorgement by the issuer. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77q(a), 77t(d) (2006). In contrast, the focus here is on fraud in connection with already
outstanding stock where the company itself is not, necessarily, involved in the sale or purchase of
stock.
3. Although most securities fraud actions are brought as a result of a decrease in stock
value, this is not always that case. See Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class
Action as We Know It. 4 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 1. 54 (2007) [hereinafter Booth, The End of the
Securities Fraud Class Action]; see, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 228 (1988)
(involving a class action for injury sustained from the sale of "shares at artificially depressed prices
in a market affected by petitioners' misleading statements and in reliance thereon").
4. To be precise, under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), as amended by the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), the price must be determined by
averaging closing prices for ninety days after corrective disclosure. See Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 § 21D(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (2006). See generally Richard A. Booth,
Vindfall Awvards Under PSLRA, 59 Bus. LAW. 1043, 1045 (2004) [hereinafter Booth, W'indal
Awards] (critiquing the formula for damages contained in the PSLRA).
5. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch. Reassessing Damages in Securities Fraud
Class Actions. 66 MD. L. REv. 348, 374-76 (2007) [hereinafter Burch, Reassessing Damages]
(theorizing that diversified investors should view the transaction costs associated with private
securities fraud class actions as an unnecessary tax on returns).
6. See Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 3. at 3; see also
BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 359, 368-69 (9th ed. 2007) (noting
that "[e]ach investor shares proportionately in the net income and in the capital gains and losses of
the fund's portfolio," and "the fund offsets unavoidable gains by judiciously selling other securities
on which there is a loss").
7. See Richard A. Booth, Class Coilict in Securities Fraud Litigation, 14 U. PA. J. Bus. L.
701, 714-16 (2012) [hereinafter Booth, Class Conflict].
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otherwise would as a result of corrective disclosure.8  In other words, the
prospect of payout magnifies the decline and further increases the prospect of
payout.9 Thus, holders suffer bigger losses because of this feedback effect.10 As
for buyers, recovery (if any) is reduced by attorney fees and other expenses of
litigation.11 Clearly, diversified investors would be better off in a world without
8. See Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 3, at 3, 5.
9. See id at 3. As discussed in Part IL this process reaches a natural limit depending on the
size of the plaintiff class.
10. This is true even for undiversified investors who might thus oppose securities fraud class
actions, as a matter of principle, when considering the matter behind a Rawlsian "veil of
ignorance' -not knowing whether they will be buyers or holders when a fraud arises. See JOIHN-
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971).
11. Under the rules governing class actions, the attorney fees of the plaintiff class are paid
out of the recovery. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h). Since 1996. there have been more than 2.800
securities fraud class actions filed seeking compensation for investors who typically bought stocks
at prices inflated by defendant company misrepresentations. See CORNERSTONE RES., SECURITIES
CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2010 YEAR IN REVIEW 3 fig.2, 32 fig.29 (2011) [hereinafter 2010
FILINGS], available at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse-research/2010 YIR/Cornerstone
Research Filings 2010 YIR.pdf (listing the number of securities fraud class actions filed per year
since 1996 and noting that, from 2006 to 2010, 1Ob-5 claims accounted for a substantial majority of
total claims); see also CORNERSTONE RES.. SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASE FILINGS: 2006 MID-
YEAR ASSESSMENT 14, Exhibit 9 (2006) (finding that 10b-5 claims accounted for 93% of total
filings in 2005); infra app. (listing figures for each year). II the aggregate, these lawsuits have
resulted in $1.816 trillion in damages, or disclosure dollar losses, for defendant companies and have
settled for aggregate payments of approximately S64 billion, represented by market capitalization
losses. See 2010 FILINGS, supra, at 24 (listing the total amount of disclosure dollar loss per year
since 1996); ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RES., SECURITIES CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2010 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 2 fig.2 (2011) (listing the total amount of
settlement dollars in 2010 and in the preceding years); see also infra app. (listing figures for each
year). A rough, but conservative estimate of about 20% of the settlement amount typically goes
toward plaintiff attorney fees. See ANJAN V. THAKOR ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL
REFORM. THE EcONOMIc REALITY OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION app. III, Exhibit A
(2005), available at http://www.instituteforlegalrefonm.com/doc/the-econonic-reality,-of-securities-
class-action-litigation (finding, in a sample of 482 class actions, that $3.1 billion in attorney fees
were paid in connection with settlements totaling $19.8 billion-roughly 16%o); Theodore Eisenberg
& Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993 2008. 7 J.
EMPIRicAL LEGAL STUD. 248, 258-59 & tbl.3 (2010) (finding average fees of 23%); Denise N.
Martin et al., Recent Trends IV W- ihat Explains Filings and Settlements in Shareholder Class
Actions, 5 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 121, 141 (1999) (finding average fees of 32%).
268
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class actions since they would break even.12 In short, the cure is worse than the
disease.13
The problems with securities fraud class actions are most apparent when
viewed in the context of an index fund: a mutual fund that seeks to match the
performance of the market as a whole by holding the stocks that compose an
index such as the S&P 500. 14 A typical index fund trades almost exclusively for
purposes of portfolio balancing in order to hold shares in proportion to market
capitalization. In other words, an index fund periodically buys additional
shares of portfolio stocks that have risen in value and sells shares of portfolio
stocks that have fallen in value relative to other portfolio stocks.16 When an
index fund trades, it almost always buys a few additional shares of a stock that it
already owns or sells a few shares of a stock that it continues to hold.17 Thus, an
index fund usually holds many more shares than the number it buys or sells. 8
As a result, an index fund almost always loses more as a holder than it gains as a
buyer from the settlement of a class action.
It is ironic that the law should cause more harm to investors than they would
otherwise suffer. But it is doubly ironic that the cost of securities litigation falls
disproportionately on diversified buy-and-hold investors-investors who seek to
maximize returns and minimize expenses by eschewing any effort to beat the
market, often by investing through index funds that offer complete
12. See Booth. The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 3, at 10-I 1. To be
sure, there might be more fraud in the absence of the deterrent effect of securities fraud class
actions, and investors might thus be worse off despite the untoward side effects thereof. See, e.g.,
John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1564 (2006) (asserting that "one cannot safely
eliminate corporate liability in securities class actions without radically reducing the likelihood of
private enforcement"). But there are other more efficient means of deterrence. See infra Part IV.A
(discussing the use of stockholder derivative actions to recoup losses suffered by the company as a
result of the securities fraud).
13. See, e.g., Kevin LaCroix, Private Securities Litigation: Important Deterrent or Wasteful
Churn?. D&O DIARY (Oct. 26, 2008, 3:27 PM), http://www.dandodiary.com/2008/10/articles/
securities-litigation/private-securities-litigation-important-deterrent-or-wastefil-chur/ (reporting that,
according to Stanford Law School Professor Joseph Grundfest, private securities litigation is a
mechanism "'for moving money around for the benefit of the people moving the money around"').
14. See Alan R. Palmiter & Ahmed E. Taha. Mutual Fund Investors: Divergent Profiles,
2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 934, 985 (citing 4 TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE
REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS: MUTUAL FUNDS AND ADVISORS § 31.02[J], at 31-101 (2d
ed. Supp. 2012)).
15. See id. (citing MALKIEL, supra note 6, at 360). An index fund may also trade in reaction
to the inflow and outflow of cash from the fund because the lower management and transaction
costs provide more fund liquidity. See id.
16. See Booth. Class Conflict, supra note 7, at 717 & n.29; William A. Birdthistle, The
Fortunes and Foibles of Exchange-Traded Funds: A Positive farket Response to the Problems of'
Autual Funds, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 69, 72-73 (2008).
17. See Booth, Class Conflict, supra note 7, at 716 ("In the real world, a diversified investor
often buys more of a stock that is already in her portfolio or sells some but not all of the shares of a
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diversification and rock-bottom expenses. 19  Indeed, many (if not most)
investment advisers counsel their clients to diversify and refrain from trading
except for purposes of portfolio balancing and tax planning.20 In short, securities
fraud class actions effectively penalize the most rational investors for the benefit
of irrational investors who decline to diversify and who seek to pick winners.
Numerous legal scholars have noted the circularity inherent in securities
fraud class actions: because the defendant company pays, the cost of settlement
is ultimately borne by the stockholders. 1 In other words, investors effectively
compensate themselves. 2 Most legal scholars have concluded that such a
remedy cannot be justified as a compensation scheme, although most also
2^believe that class actions serve an important deterrent function. 2 But few
19. See Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class 4ction, supra note 3, at 5 ("A second
tundamental problem with [securities fraud class actions] is that the defendant company pays the
damages. As a result, the value of the defendant company is reduced by the amount of the payout in
addition to any decline in the stock price of the company that results fiom disclosure of new
information. In a bad-news case, this reduction in value itself results in a turther decline in stock
price and sets up a positive feedback mechanism that can lead to a total decline in price that may be
several times the decline that would have resulted simply from the disclosure of negative
information.").
20. See, e.g., MALKIEL, supra note 6, at 186-90 (describing and illustrating modem portfolio
theory and the principles of diversification); ROBERT W. H-AMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH,
BusINEss BASICS FOR LAW STUDENTS: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS § 3.2, at 36 (3d
ed. 2002) (asserting that "rational investors divers[y"); Booth, Class Conflict, supra note 7, at 712
(noting that diversified investors may trade for purposes of tax planning and portfolio balance);
Isabella Steger, First Lesson in Mlanaging Money: Diversify, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2012,
12:12 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303665904577449980295801666.html
(interviewing David Chang, the head of Franklin Templeton in Greater China, who supports
diversification as a matter of both furd management and investor education).
21. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 12, at 1536 ("Rather, because the costs of securities class
actions-both the settlement payments and the litigation expenses of both sides-fall largely on the
defendant corporation, its shareholders ultimately bear these costs indirectly and often
inequitably.").
22. Id. at 1558.
23. See id. at 1534, 1572 73 (questioning the "moral entitlement" of investor plaintiffs
seeking recovery in securities fraud class actions and considering whether "the deterrent benefits
can justify these costs"); Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities
Litigation, 2009 WIs. L. REV. 333, 336, 340 (noting two goals of private securities litigation:
compensation for investor loss and deterrence of managerial misconduct); Merritt B. Fox, Civil
Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 281 (2009) [hereinafter Fox, Civil
Liability and Mandatory Disclosure] (acknowledging the weakness of the compensation
justification for securities fraud class actions, but noting their deterrence value); Merritt B. Fox,
WThv Civil Liabilitv for Disclosure Violations Whlen Issuers Do Not Trade?, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 297,
332 [hereinafter Fox, Wi'hy Civil Liability?] ("Despite the weakness of its compensatory justification,
the cause of action serves important deterrence functions .... "); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming
Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relative Relationship Between Public and Private
Enforcement of Rule l0b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1322, 1363-64 (2008) (noting the
widespread criticism of damages under Rule 10b-5 class actions, but suggesting that Securities and
Exchange Commission oversight of these lawsuits would mitigate the negative aspects of both
private and public enforcement schemes). But see Thomas A. Dubbs, A Scotch Verdict on
"Circularitv" and Other Issues. 2009 Wis. L. REV. 455, 455-60, 463 (discussing the problem of
270 [VOL. 64: 265
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commentators have recognized that class actions actually magnify investor
losses in two distinct ways.24
First, since a diversified investor is effectively insured against securities
fraud by virtue of being diversified, the cost of securities litigation in attorney
fees, other expenses, and management distraction is a deadweight loss that
serves only to reduce portfolio return. In other words, the class action remedy
is akin to buying an insurance policy on a risk that one has already hedged away,
for free, through diversification.26 Investors would do better to self-insure
through diversification than to rely on transfer payments to each other by which
holders pay buyers but buyers get back only what is left after attorney fees and
other litigation expenses are deducted.27
Second, if the plaintiff class is one of buyers, as it almost always is, the cost
of settlement in a successful securities fraud class action is borne exclusively by
28those who held the stock during the fraud period. In theory, buyers are made
whole by their recovery.29 But even if buyers recover only part of their loss,
holders pay.30  In other words, class actions clearly effect an internal
circular compensation under Rule lOb-5 and concluding that more research needs to be done on the
subject); James C. Spindler, Vicarious LiabilityJb Bad Corporate Governance: Are We Wrong
About 10b-5?, 13 AM. L. & EcoN. REV. 359, 397-98 (2011) (concluding that Rule lOb-5 class
actions serve their compensatory purposes well).
24. But see Booth, De End of the Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 3, at 3
(describing how securities fraud class actions cause additional investor losses because of the
feedback effect that arises from payout by defendant company to plaintiff class).
25. See Booth, Class Conflict, supra note 7. at 716; see also Burch, Reassessing Danages,
supra note 5, at 374 76 (explaining how litigation expenses should be viewed as n unnecessary tax
to diversified investors).
26. Diversification is effectively costless since it is usually cheaper to hold a mutual fund
than to maintain a brokerage account as would be necessary to hold one or a few stocks. See Booth.
Class Conflict, supra note 7, at 711 n.16; see also Booth, [he End of the Securities Fraud Class
Action, supra note 3, at 12-13 ("[A] diversified investor ... is effectively insured against loss from
simple securities fraud ... .").
27. See supra notes 25 26 and accompanying text.
28. See Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 3, at 8 n.14 (noting
that, wvhen the company sued pays damages, "[t]he award goes to those wvho bought or sold during
the class period at the expense of longer term investors wlho did not trade during the fraud period");
see also Coffee, supra note 12, at 1556-57 (noting that the class action plaintiffs aim to recover
"from equally nonculpable continuing shareholders").
29. See Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 3, at 4. The effects
are somewhat different in good-news cases where buyers effectively pay a portion of their gains to
seller plaintiffs. See id at 8 & nn. 14 15. Although good-news cases are quite rare, see id, such
cases have figured quite prominently in the development of the law in this area. See, e.g., Basic Inc.
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 228 (1988) (involving a class action for injury sustained from the sale of
"shares at artificially depressed prices in a market affected by petitioners' misleading statements and
in reliance thereon"); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 839-42, 847 (2d Cir. 1968)
(considering 1Ob-5 claims of insider trading related to a stock purchase made just prior to a press
release regarding news that would double the stock price in one month).
30. See Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 3, at 8 n.14. To be
sure, the claim may be covered by insurance, but the defendant company pays for the insurance.
2012] 271
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redistribution of corporate wealth.3 1  Thus, investors who tend to be holders
should oppose class actions in principle.
Nevertheless, it is puzzling to think that diversified investors should be
indifferent to securities fraud.
The answer to this puzzle is that when buyers sue for securities fraud, their
losses may come from three sources, all of which are impounded in the lower
stock price of the defendant company: (1) lower expected return, (2) higher cost
of capital, and (3) direct expenses of litigation and enforcement-such as
attorney fees and other litigation expenses, civil and criminal fines, and damages
or settlement amounts payable to buyers.) Moreover, an increase in cost of
capital may come from two sources: a market perception of more risk inherent in
the business of the subject company or harm to the reputation of the subject
company-a loss of trust-esulting from the fraud.i In a class action, all of
these losses are represented in the aggregate decrease in stock price.
Not all of these losses are the result of fraud. Losses that flow from lower
expected returns and higher expected risk will occur one way or the other, albeit
35sooner rather than later in the absence of fraud.. Diversified investors are
indifferent to these losses because they wash out over time, fraud or no fraud.36
But the losses that flow from a higher cost of capital resulting from reputational
harm and the cost of litigation and enforcement are different. In a world with
class actions, buyers can recover for these losses because they are built into the
decrease in stock price. In a world without class actions, buyers too would
The bottom line is that one can and should ignore insurance for purposes of analyzing the merits of
securities fraud class actions. See infra Parts II, V.A.
31. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 12, at 1583 (arguing that Rule lOb-5 litigation "essentially
produces pocket-shifting wealth transfers that injure shareholders"); Fisch, supra note 23, at 334
(identifying the "circularity problem" of private securities litigation which "merely transfers funds
from one set of shareholders to another"). Although most commentators wlho have noted the
circularity problem have tended to focus on the aggregate-or "macro"-effects of class actions,
commentators who have focused on these "micro" distributional effects have tended to justify the
result on some sort of theory that holders owe something to buyers. See Lawrence E. Mitchell. The
"Innocent Shareholder": An Essav on Compensation and Deterrence in Securities Class-Action
Lawsuits, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 243, 292 ("It is shareholders themselves who have the power and thus
the responsibility to protect the integrity of our financial markets through their voting and
trading."); James J. Park. Shareholder Compensation as Dividend, 108 MICH. L. REV. 323. 331-32.
338-39 (2009) (distinguishing shareholders who purchased stock during the period of fraud from
those who purchased prior to this period, and arguing that the latter group of "Non-Class
Shareholders" should compensate the "Class Shareholders" because these shareholders were the
ones who suffered directly as a result of the fraud). But see Amanda M. Rose & Richard Squire,
Intraportfolio Litigation, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1679, 1697 (2011) (propounding the theory that
litigation between companies whose stock is held in the same portfolio has the beneficial effect of
reallocating capital to its highest and best use).
32. See Booth, Class Conflict, supra note 7, at 709-10.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See Booth. The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 3, at 10 & n.21.
36. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
37. See Booth, Class Conflict, supra note 7, at 708-09, 714-15.
272 [VOL. 64: 265
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suffer these genuine losses-even if the buyers are diversified investors. In a
world with class actions, these losses are effectively transferred to holders
through feedback.39  Most commentators seem to view this redistribution of
stockholder wealth as an unfortunate side effect of class actions. 40 At worst, it is
a necessary evil if we are to preserve the deterrent effect that goes with securities
litigation. Besides, for diversified investors it all comes out in the wash.
Not so. First, the cost falls almost solely on holders and thus
disproportionately on index funds-the investment of choice for the most
rational investors.43 Second, and more important, the genuine losses that flow
from securities fraud are losses that affect all stockholders in the same way.44
Thus, they are claims that should be asserted derivatively on behalf of the
corporation.45 If the corporation is made whole, both buyers and holders are
38. See id.
39. See Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 3, at 3. 8 n.14. For
purposes of analysis, the discussion here generally assumes that buyers recover 100% of their
losses. On the one hand, it seems appropriate to analyze the law on its own terms, even if real
world cases typically settle for cents on the dollar, since the strength of the plaintiffs casei-and
hence the plaintiffs bargaining power-depends on the damages that the plaintiff might be awarded
if the case were litigated to judgment. This is irrespective of whether the defendant would be able
to pay. In other words, the parties negotiate in the shadow of the law. On the other hand, the
analysis here does not depend on full recovery. For example, any amount paid by the defendant
company to settle a class action results in a decrease in the value of the defendant company for the
benefit of buyers. See id. at 5. Thus, if the plaintiff class recovers anything at all, holders in the
aggregate lose to the same extent. See id
40. See Coffee, supra note 12. at 1583: see also Fisch, supra note 23, at 334 (acknowledging
the "circulatory problem" of private securities litigation, which "merely transfers funds from one set
of shareholders to another").
41. See Coffee, supra note 12, at 1586: see also Fisch, supra note 23, at 338 (noting that, due
to the criticisms of securities fraud class actions, "commentators have turned to deterrence as an
alternative justification for private litigation").
42. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
43. See snpra notes 6, 7, 18, and 19.
44. See, e.g., Barbara Black, Reputational Danages in Securities Litigation, 35 J. CORP. L.
169, 181 (2009) (noting that, in cases of securities fraud, "all shareholders suffer loss in value of
their investments resulting from the market's reassessment of the integrity of management and
internal controls").
45. See, e.g., Pfeiffer v. Toll, 989 A.2d 683, 699 (Del. Ch. 2010) (asserting that a claim is
"fundamentally derivative ... because it arises out of the misuse of corporate property that is,
confidential information-by a fiduciary of the corporation, for the benefit of the fiduciary and to
the detriment of the corporation" (quoting Latesco, L.P. v. Wayport, Inc., C.A. No. 4167-VCL,
2009 WL 2246793, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on
other grounds by Kahn v. Kolberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 23 A.3d 831 (Del. 2011). Although
commentators have noted that some of the loss from securities fraud flows from such sources, few
have connected the dots with the possibility of a derivative action for the benefit of the corporation.
See Black, supra note 44, at 182 (arguing that "allowing recovery for reputational damages furthers
the policy ... that investors should be able to rely on the corporation's financial statements"); see
also Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, The Loss Causation Requirenent for Rule 10b5 Causes ofAction:
The Inplication ofDura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo. 63 Bus. LAW. 163, 185 (2007) (criticizing
the "back-casting" approach to the calculation of damages per share, which makes "it difticult to
estimate with any degree of reliability the inflation during the damage period using the price drop
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made whole.4 6 Moreover, the threat of a derivative action provides a perfectly
tailored deterrent for securities fraud---one that compensates investors solely for
the genuine harm they suffer.47 Legal scholars have noted that class actions
seem to constitute excessive deterrence in that they encourage too many
lawsuits, but no one has offered a cogent explanation as to why.48 A logical
explanation is that in a class action, plaintiffs can, in theory, recover for their
total loss. including the portion of the loss that would happen even in the absence
of fraud. 9  As a result, there are too many class actions, and defendant
companies invest too much in prevention and defense). In short, a derivative
action is clearly superior to a class action as a remedy for securities fraud.
This Article proceeds as follows:
Part 11 outlines the law and practice of securities fraud class actions and
describes the problems created by the fact that the defendant company ultimately
funds any settlement. Foremost is the problem of feedback: since the defendant
company pays in any successful class action, stock price falls more than it
otherwise would, increasing the amount of the class claim and foisting collateral
damage on holders. Although most claims are paid by insurance, the corporation
ultimately pays because the expense of insurance-including increases in
premiums going forward-reduces returns and thus reduces market
capitalization.
Part III describes the rationale for, and operation of, index funds as well as
their importance for conservative investors. This Part also analyzes the effect of
securities fraud class actions on returns in various trading scenarios and finds
that index funds almost always lose more than they gain from a class action.
Accordingly, index fund investors should favor the abolition of class actions.
Part IV explores the methods by which an index fund might oppose a
securities fraud class action. Although there are good reasons why a court
should decline to certify a securities fraud action as a class action, the better fix
is for an index fund to advocate for a derivative action, seeking to recover for the
losses suffered by the corporation from any increase in the cost of capital and
associated with the disclosure"); Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers. Stock Price Crashes and 1Ob-5
Damages: A Legal. Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7. 34 (1994) (arguing that
there should be no recovery for consequential "crash damages" resulting from disclosures made in
connection with securities fraud). But see Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, supra
note 23, at 240, 290 (proposing a system of issuer liability under federal securities law in which
"any shareholder could bring a suit on behalf of the corporation against an officer, director, or
external certifier").
46. See Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 3. at 24
("Diversified investors can be made vhole by issuer recovery of insider gains.").
47. See id.
48. See Booth, Class Conflict, supra note 7, at 702; see also Rose, supra note 23, at 1322
(noting that some commentators believe "excessive securities litigation continues to overdeter,
harming the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets by driving issuers abroad").
49. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note II.
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any expenses associated with enforcement. Since class actions are oftenjustified
by their supposed benefits in deterring fraud, this Part also considers the
deterrent effect of derivative actions and argues that they offer superior
deterrence in every situation in which a meritorious class action would lie.
Whenever a class action that would survive a motion to dismiss can be pleaded,
a derivative action that would survive a motion to dismiss may also be pleaded.
In addition, this Part considers the details of practice and procedure relating to
class actions and derivative actions. In the end, it is up to the court to decide
whether a claim is direct or derivativex And the law is clear that if a claim can
be litigated as a derivative claim, it must be so litigated." It matters not that the
plaintiff styles the claim as a direct class claim if the claim is in fact derivative.
In addition, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), which
governs class actions, provides that a claim for damages may be certified as a
class action only if it is superior to any other means of litigating the claim. 54
Indeed, it is arguable that a claim for damages may be certified as a class action
only if there is no other way to litigate the claim.7 Since a derivative action is
clearly superior as to the part of a claim that affects all stockholders in the same
way, FRCP Rule 23 mandates that the claim be litigated as a derivative action.5 6
Finally, Part V considers why class actions survive as the dominant form of
securities litigation when derivative actions are clearly superior. There are
several powerful forces at work in favor of class actions and against derivative
actions, including the larger attorney fees generated by class actions, the lack of
insurance coverage for derivative actions, the failure of litigants to recognize the
costs associated with class actions, and a body of law and precedent that
entrenches the status quo from several different angles. Ultimately, index
funds-which almost always lose more than they gain from class actions-are
the most likely litigants to advocate for derivative actions to supplant direct
actions.5 7  But for index funds to step up to the task, it is crucial that they
understand the respective costs and benefits of class actions and derivative
actions as explained herein.
II. SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS AND INVESTOR WELFARE
In the typical Rule 1Ob-5 class action, the plaintiff class consists of investors
who buy a stock when its price is allegedly inflated because of a false statement
51. See Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 3, at 24.
52. See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1037 (Del. 2004)
(citing Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d 246 (Del. 1970)).
53. See Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., Inc.. 546 A.2d 348, 352 (Del. 1988) (quoting Lipton v.
News Int'l, PLC, 514 A.2d 1075, 1078 (Del. 1986)).
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
55. See supra note 52.
56. See FED. R. Cly. P. 23(b)(3).
57. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
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made by the issuer corporation. 8  When the truth comes out, stock price drops,
and buyers file suit against the issuer company. But only the buyers may sue.59
And since the company, or its insurer, pays, it is the other stockholders who
effectively lose.60 In other words, holders pay buyers.61
Moreover, because the prospect of payout increases the potential for loss, it
also increases the class claim and further increases the loss.62 For example,
suppose that Binford Tool Company's stock is trading at $20 per share based on
projected earnings of $2 per share. Management learns that a major customer
plans to cancel its contract with the company. As a result, actual earnings are
likely to fall to $1.50 per share for the coming year. Nevertheless, in a
conference call with investors and analysts, Binford management reassures the
market that the company is on target to meet expectations. But for this
misrepresentation, one might expect stock price to fall from $20 to $15 when the
truth becomes public. But because management lied to the market, and because
the company will likely be sued in a securities fraud class action, the stock price
falls further to $10. To be sure, some of the additional $5 decrease may be
attributable to the market's perception that Binford is a riskier business than
previously thought or to a loss of trust in management both of which may result
in an increase in the cost of capital. But some of the additional decline is
presumably attributable to the prospect of payout.63 Thus, a securities fraud
class action causes some of the loss that it seeks to recover.
58. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. As noted above, it is also possible that a fraud
may involve the cover-up of good news such that sellers suffer the loss, but the vast majority of
securities fraud class actions involve the cover-up of bad news rather than good news. See supra
note 29. Thus, the discussion here assumes that the fraud involves the cover-up of bad news and
hence a class comprising buyers.
59. Merrill Lynch, Pierce. Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 79 (2006) (citing
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461. 464 (2d Cir. 1952)); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975) (citing Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 463-64).
60. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
61. Again. the focus here is on fraud involving outstanding stock where the issuer company
itself is not involved in any sale or purchase. Where the company itself sells stock to the public by
means of fraud, the 1933 Act provides for a disgorgement remedy by which the company must
compensate buyers. See supra note 2: see, e.g., SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d
90, 96 (2d Cir. 1978) (explaining that "the SEC makes the proceeds of disgorgement available to
injured parties"). In such a case, the pre-fraud stockholders, if any, effectively give back their ill-
gotten gains of underpriced capital. See, e.g., id. at 95 (explaining that by disgorging profits, the
court is "exercising [its] discretion to prevent unjust enrichment").
62. See Booth, Class Conflict, supra note 7, at 706 & n.8. Mercifully, the process reaches a
mathematical limit based on the size ofthe plaintiff class.
63. The market makes this assessment more or less instantaneously. See Jeffrey S. Glaser,
Comment. The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Risk V aluation, Judicial Interpretation, and Market
Bias, 50 Bus. LAW. 687, 694 (1995). In the real world, the truth may come out in stages. See, e.g.,
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 339 (2005) (involving the progressive disclosure of bad
news). Moreover, corrective disclosures may be mixed with other disclosures such that it is
difficult to isolate the effects of fraud. See, e.g.. Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc.
v. Halliburton Co., 597 F.3d 330, 340 (5th Cir. 2010), vacated sub nom. Erica P. John Fund. Inc. v.
Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2187 (2011) (reasoning that a press release correcting a
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One might justify this system as a form of investor insurance.64 But most
investors are already effectively insured because they are well diversified by
virtue of investing through institutions such as mutual funds and pension plans.
Indeed, more than two-thirds of all stock is held through such institutions. 66 A
diversified investor is just as likely to sell an overpriced stock and gain as to buy
one and lose.67 So it all comes out in the wash. The costs of securities
litigation-in attorney fees, other expenses, and management distraction-are a
deadweight loss that serves only to reduce aggregate investor return. 68  An
undiversified investor who puts all of his eggs in one basket might be happy to
forgo some return as a fee for such insurance j List as one buys fire insurance on
one's home. But for a diversified investor, the deadweight loss is the equivalent
of buying an extended warranty on a toaster. It is better to self-insure.
Moreover, diversified investors lose when they are mere holders of a fraud-
affected stock-which is most of the time. 69 Most investment advisers agree that
a buy-and-hold strategy makes the most sense for most investors. 0 But even a
buy-and-hold investor needs to rebalance his portfolio from time to time. For
such an investor, securities fraud class actions may generate more in additional
feedback loss than the amount of the recovery.n
For example, suppose that Rearguard Fund holds a portfolio of 1,000 stocks
with a total value of $10 billion, including $80 million in Binford. In the course
of rebalancing its portfolio, Rearguard buys another $20 million in Binford
during the fraud period so that it now holds a total of $100 million. When
Binford falls from $20 per share to $10 per share, Rearguard loses a total of $50
million on its investment. But Rearguard has a claim only for the $10 million
loss on the $20 million purchase that it made during the fraud period, though.
Assuming that plaintiff attorney fees and other expenses will reduce the recovery
company's prior estimate of "asbestos reserves" was not misleading or deceptive therefore, the
"press release was not an actionable corrective disclosure"). These are serious practical problems in
litigating securities fraud claims. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking
Fraud on the Mlarket. 2009 WIs. L. REv. 151, 179-80 (arguing that the use of an event study-i.e.,
scientific expert testimony to establish loss causation in private securities litigation-"no longer
offers a clean assessment of the intrinsic value of the fraud"). But these difficulties do not affect the
analysis here. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, the assumption here is that the corrective disclosure
happens all at once and in isolation from other news that might affect stock price.
64. See Langevoort, supra note 63, at 165-66.
65. See supra notes 25 27 and accompanying text.
66. Booth, Class Conflict, supra note 7, at 711.
67. See id. at 706.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See Burton G. Malkiel, Op-Ed., 'Buy and Hold' Is Still a Winner, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18,
2010. at A23.
71. Id.
72. See Booth. Class Conflict, supra note 7, at 706-07.
73. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (2006): see, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201. 228 &
n.8 (3d Cir. 2001) (limiting stockholder recovery to the difference between the amount paid at
purchase and arnount received when sold).
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by 20%, 74 Rearguard can recover no more than $8 million. Rearguard also
suffers a loss on the stock that it held before the fraud, which has fallen in value
from $80 million to $40 million. To keep things simple, assume for now that the
decrease in price is attributable solely to lower than expected return plus
feedback from the prospect of a class action in which 50% of the outstanding
shares are likely to recover their losses in full. In such a case, bad news explains
the first $5 per share of loss, and feedback explains the next $5 per share of
loss.i5 In contrast, in a world without class actions. Binford would decrease from
$20 to $15. The Rearguard investment would have declined from $100 million
to $75 million for a loss of $25 million. In a world with class actions, Rearguard
loses $50 million less the recovery of $8 million for a total net loss of $42
million. In other words, Rearguard loses an additional $17 million on its
holdings because Binford must pay to settle the class claim.
Needless to say, Rearguard would prefer that the class action simply be
dismissed. To be sure, the law provides that one can always opt out of a class
action,76 but it does no good for Rearguard to opt out. By opting out, the fund
forgoes any recovery, and its net loss would be $50 million. Thus, the fund will
reluctantly file a claim in the class action despite its preference that the action be
dismissed.
The idea that some investors lose more than they gain from a class action is
based on the fact that stock price falls more than it should because of feedback.
But it could be argued that if the award is paid by insurance (as it usually is),
there would be no feedback because the company would not use its own funds.
Thus, there would be no reason for anyone to object to class certification. In
practice, many cases are settled for whatever amount of insurance is available.
There are several responses to this argument.
First, we should evaluate securities litigation on its own merits. The law-
as it currently stands-is that the defendant company compensates traders who
suffer a loss. Although securities fraud class actions almost always settle if they
are not dismissed, bargaining happens in the shadow of the law. The starting
point for settlement negotiations is the potential award. The fact that the bill
may be paid by insurance is irrelevant. There would be no bill but for the
74. See supra note II.
75. In a case in which the plaintiff class comprises 50% of the outstanding shares and the
class recovers its loss in full, the effect is to double the decrease in price that would occur in the
absence of any recovery from the defendant corporation. See infra note 127 and Tables I & 2. If
the class is smaller or would recover less, the magnification effect is less, and vice versa. See inira
note 127 and Tables 1 & 2. For a derivation of the algorithm by which the feedback effect can be
predicted, see Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 3, at app. The
mathematics of feedback is discussed in more detail in Part III.A.
76. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v).
77. This discussion of the role insurance in securities fraud class actions is taken almost
verbatim from my discussion of the same issue in an earlier article, but it is somewhat condensed
and clarified with additional footnotes acknowledging certain open questions of fact. See Richard
A. Booth. Class Conflict in Securities Fraud Litigation, 14 U. PA. J. BuS. L.701, 718-19 (2012).
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imposition of liability. That is one reason why evidence of insurance is
generally inadmissible.
Second, if insurance is depleted by securities litigation it will be unavailable
for other purposes. If the company must pay other claims out of its own pocket,
it may fail altogether. In a sense, insurance is part of the capitalization of the
company in that it protects the company from unforeseeable major expenses. So
79it is not costless-nor a matter of sunk cost-for the insurer to pay .
Third, if the insurance company pays, the insured will pay higher rates for
insurance in the future. That reduces expected return and thus stock price. In the
end it really makes no difference whether the insurance company pays. When
the insurance company pays, it really only finances the award. In effect, the
defendant company pays over time. Thus, there is good reason to think that
feedback happens whether or not the award is paid by insurance.s0
Fourth, when an insurance company pays, rates go up for all potential
defendant companies. Every successful securities fraud action increases the risk
of future such actions. When insurance rates go up, investor return goes down.
Feedback echoes throughout the market. Diversified investors may lose even
more as holders of other stocks.81
78. See FED. R. EVID. 411; see also Richard Squire, How Collective Settlemnents Camouflage
the Costs of Shareholder Lawsuits. 62 DUKE L.J. 1 passin (2012) (arguing that the structure of
insurance contributes to excessive settlements). But see Christopher C. French, Response,
Segmented Settlemnents Are Not the Answer: A Response to Professor Squire's Article, 1-ow
Collective Settlements Camouflage the Costs of Shareholder Lawsuits 3-11 (Dec. 15, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with South Carolina Law Review).
79. This argument is somewhat stronger if the amount of liability insurance available covers
many different types of risk. It is somewhat weaker if the amount available to cover securities fraud
class actions whether in the form of D&O coverage or otherwise-is segregated for that purpose
alone. See generally ToM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH. ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT:
How LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 65-66 (2010). But even if
coverage is strictly compartmentalized, depletion of available coverage for one action makes it
unavailable for another action arising during the relevant policy period. Moreover, there are many
other risks other than those of securities fraud class actions that may be covered by a D&O policy.
80. On the other hand, it has been argued by some commentators that D&O insurance
premium rates depend little on claims experience and (implicitly) that insurance companies make
little or no effort to determine whether a company seeking coverage is more or less likely to the be
the target of an action that will trigger a claim. See id. at 119-20.
This is quite difficult to believe, although it may be that insurance companies simply refuse to
write coverage if the buyer is seen as too risky or if the buyer is likely to cancel coverage in the
future-because of business failure or otherwise-such that the payments on claims cannot be
recouped. It is also possible that having tried somehow to predict which companies will be the
target of securities fraud class actions and having failed to do so, insurance companies regard such
risk as utterly random. But if there is nothing that potential target companies can do to manage such
risk, it would seem to indicate that there is something wrong with the law of securities fraud, which
after all is supposed to be some sort of intentional wrong.
81. In other words, even if insurance companies fail to set rates based on claims expectations
and experience, presumably they set rates high enough overall to make a profit. If indeed insurance
companies fail to set rates based on any individualized assessment of likely claims, it would seem to
undermine the argument that litigation between portfolio companies makes sense because investors
prefer companies to bear their own individual risks so that capital will be allocated more efficiently.
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The situation is quite different when a third party such as a tort victim makes
a claim against a corporation, she wants to collect as much as possible. It does
not matter if insurance coverage for other claims is thus reduced or if premiums
increase and the market value of the company declines or indeed if the company
is rendered bankrupt in the process. But if the claimant is a group of
stockholders, the interests of those who would collect conflict with those who
would not. Indeed, even for stockholders who would collect there is a downside
in that they may do more harm to the value of the stock they hold than they
recover on the stock they bought. The situation is similar to that of an
automobile owner who declines to make a claim for fear that his rates will
increase or his insurance will be cancelled.
In short, the fact that securities fraud class action settlements are often paid
by insurance is ultimately irrelevant to the question whether such actions are
consistent with the interests of investors.
III. INDEX FUNDS AND THE RATIONAL INVESTOR
As the title suggests, this Article focuses on how index funds fare in the
context of securities fraud class actions and seeks to determine whether
securities fraud class actions are consistent with the interests of index funds
given that index funds tend to engage in minimal trading and thus tend to hold
many more shares of a given stock than they buy or sell.8
One important reason for this focus is that approximately 15% of all mutual
fund assets are held in the form of index funds. Another good reason for this
focus is that an investment strategy employing index funds is the most rational
strategy for most investors.84 Thus, an index fund may be seen as a model of the
See Rose & Squire, supra note 31, at 1697. Moreover. one could argue that diversified investors
should prefer portfolio companies that buy as little insurance as possible. See Richard A. Booth,
Mlanager's Journal: Reducing Risk Doesn't Pay Off WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 1999, at A18.
82. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
83. INv. CO. INST., 2011 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 33 (51st ed. 2011). Moreover,
index funds have grown dramatically in recent years up from about 5% in 1996-in part because
of the introduction of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) in 1993. Id. But it is arguable that many ETFs
are not true index funds in that many seek to track segments of the market, not to mention that they
are used for active trading. See 'Tom Lauricella & Diya Gullapalli, Not 41 Index ETFs Are What
Diey' v Seem to Be: Critics See .4ctive Management in Some New Fund Offer-ings Using 'Intuitive
Factor Analysis,' WALL ST. J., July 21, 2006, at Cl; see also Erin E. Arvedlund. W1'all Street Pushes
Designer Index Funds: Customized Products Aimed at Wealthy Investors Ofkr Tax Advantages, but
Carry Steep Fees, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2005, at DI (noting that "exchange-traded funds, or
ETFs ... resemble index funds but trade like stocks"). According to one source, true index funds
constitute about 10% of the fund market. John C. Bogle, Op-Ed., 'Value' Strategies, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 9, 2007, at AI I. On the other hand, the argument that not all purported index funds are true
index funds applies to any fund that follows a strategy that may entail buying additional shares of a
stock alreadv held.
84. See, e.g., MALKIEL, supra note 6, at 363 ("In short, the index fund is a sensible,
serviceable method for obtaining the market's rate of return with absolutely no effort and minimal
expense.").
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reasonable investor.85 Therefore, a good way to analyze securities fraud class
actions is to ask how they serve the interests of index funds and index fund
investors.
Accordingly, it is important to understand how an index fund works and why
investors choose to invest in such vehicles. As noted above, an index fund is a
mutual fund that seeks to match the performance of the market as a whole b y
holding the stocks that compose a broad-based index such as the S&P 500.
The basic goal of the indexing strategy is to maximize diversification and to
minimize fund management expenses.8
Diversification is important because, by investing in many different stocks,
an investor can eliminate all of the risk that goes with investing in an individual
company--company-specific risk-without any sacrifice of return. 8  The only
risk that remains is the risk that the market as a whole will rise or fall-risk that
cannot be diversified away. 89
Moreover, studies focusing on the performance of presumably sophisticated
mutual fund managers have found repeatedly that no one can beat the market
consistently except perhaps with illegal inside information.90 The fact that the
market is efficient is not to say that investors can expect only to break even.
The market tends to go up over time, and over time stocks generate returns that
are about 7% in excess of the risk-free rate of return.92 So the market is different
from a casino where the house ultimately wins. Nevertheless, no one can
reasonably expect to do better than the market average.
85. See id
86. See supra note 14 and accompanying discussion. The S&P 500 is the model for about
37% (by value) of all index funds. INV. Co. INST., supra note 83, at 33.
87. See MALKIEL, supra note 6, at 358-60.
88. See id at 188-89.
89. See, e.g., id at 363 ("If the market goes down, your portfolio is guaranteed to follow
suit."). Company-specific risk is sometimes called unsystematic risk or alpha risk, while market
risk is sometimes called systematic risk or beta risk. See id. at 198. Although it is possible to
reduce the risk that goes with equities by investing some portion of one's portfolio in bonds and
other asset classes, this reduction in risk also reduces return. See id at 198 201. One might call
this diversification, albeit in a different form.
90. As Jeremy Irons states in the movie M1argin Call, the only way to succeed on Wall Street
is to be first, be smarter, or cheat. MARGIN CALL (Lionsgate 2011); see also Glaser, supra note 63,
at 695 ("[A]bsent being an insider, an investor does not have access to any information that the
market does not already know."). There is even some doubt that one can beat the market with
inside information. See MALKIEL, supra note 6, at 221. More precisely, studies show that no one
can beat the market any more often than can be explained by chance. Id. In other words, given that
there are about 10,000 mutual funds in the United States, one would expect a few to beat the market
ten years running if only by chance. This is not to say that the market is necessarily correct about
the price of any individual stock. It is only to say that no one can pick winners consistently. On the
other hand, although the market may well be wrong about individual stocks, it seems quite unlikely
that the market is ever wrong about equities in general.
91. MALKIEL, supra note 6, at 180.
92. See id at 185, 326.
93. This is really a tautology. Although the children of Lake Wobegon may all be above
average, investors can never do better on the average than the average of how they do. See
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It is important to emphasize that one need not subscribe to the efficient
market theory to adopt the logic of diversification.94  It is always good to
eliminate unnecessary risk.95 Indeed, one might even say that it is irrational not
to do so.96 But if the strategy is to eliminate all company-specific risk, there is
no reason to waste time and money picking individual stocks.97  Thus,
diversification and the efficient market are two independently sufficient reasons
to eschew stock picking.
If there is nothing to be gained from picking individual stocks, it follows that
one should avoid spending too much on research and should avoid trading except
when necessary. Thus, the traditional advice to buy-and-hold is ultimately sound
as long as one also diversifies.98 Indeed, numerous studies show that the one
factor that ultimately affects fund returns is fund expenses. 99 For example, a
fund with an expense ratio of 0.5% of assets under management (AUM)
typically beats a fund with an expense ratio of 2.0% by 1.5%. o100 In the end,
reducing expenses is a sure thing. Beating the market is not. For the vast
generallv Edward B. Fiske, Lessons, N.Y TiMES, July 12, 1989, at B8 (explaining the concept of
Garrison Keillor's mythical village, Lake Wobegon).
94. Richard A. Booth, Discounts and Other lysteries of Corporate Finance, 79 CALIF. L.
REV. 1055, 1060 (1991) [hereinafter Booth, 1ysteries of Corporate Finance] ("The logic of the
efficient market and diversification does not apply to the bidders who buy control of whole
companies.").
95. See, e.g., Glaser, supra note 63, at 689-90 (discussing the capital asset price model and
the goals of modem portfolio theory to eliminate risk).
96. The iron law of investing is that if one assumes more risk, one must get more return. See
MALKIEL, supra note 6, at 201. Similarly, if one can eliminate some risk, one should be willing to
accept somewvhat lower return and to pay more for a stock. See id. It follows that diversified
investors will drive up the price of stocks and that undiversified investors must therefore pay too
much if they fail to diversity. Richard A. Booth, The Suitability Rule, Investor Diversification, and
Using Spread to 1easure Risk. 54 Bus. LAW. 1599, 1606 (1999) [hereinafter Booth, The Suitability
Rule]. Given that more than two-thirds of all stock is held by mutual funds, pension plans, and the
like, and that many well-advised individual investors are similarly diversified, it follows that
diversified investors do. in fact, dominate the market. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
On the other hand, if one can identify an investment that offers the prospect of extraordinary return,
it may nonetheless be rational to bet the farm. For example, if a portfolio of stocks offers a return of
10% per unit of risk and a particular stock offers a return of 40% with three units of risk, it is not
irrational to invest all of one's money in the latter. Ask any hedge fund manager. See Richard A.
Booth, The Buzzard Was freir Friend -Hedge Funds and the Problem ofOvervalued Equity, 10 U.
PENN. J. Bus. EMP. L. 879, 881 (2008) [hereinafter Booth, Die Buzzard Was Their Friend].
Incidentally. this example is roughly consistent with research that indicates that alpha risk accounts
for about 70% of the risk that goes with investing in ain individual stock. See Booth, The Suitability
Rule, supra, at 1605-07.
97. See Glaser, supra note 63, at 689.
98. See Malkiel, supra note 70, at A23.
99. See Palmiter & Taha, supra note 14, at 985 (citing MALKIEL, supra note 6, at 359).
100. See MALKIEL, supra note 6, at 358-63, 378. In other words, the expenses associated
with active management and stock-picking are a deadweight loss for a diversified investor. See
Booth, Class Conflict, supra note 7, at 712. Additionally, management fees generally do not
include the direct expenses of trading, such as brokerage commissions. See id Thus, actively
managed funds with higher turnover ratios have higher operating expenses too.
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majority of investors, the argument for investing in an index fund is
irrefutable.101 To be sure, an individual investor might build her own diversified
portfolio and manage it according to the same principles that govern an index
fund, o2 but such an investor will have the same interests vis-A-vis securities
fraud class actions as an index fund.
A. Index Funds and Diversification
At first blush, it may not be obvious why investing in an index fund is a
prudent way to diversify since it is not necessarily apparent why mimicking the
composition and performance of the S&P 500 (or any other index) would
eliminate company-specific risk. The answer is that investing in an index is not
itself the point. Rather, the point is to eliminate company-specific risk by
investing in the market as a whole.103 Again, portfolio theory indicates that it is
possible to diversify away company-specific risk but not market risk.104  it
follows that by investing in the market as a whole, one can eliminate all of the
risk that can be eliminated since the market is, by definition, the average of its
component companies. o0 Accordingly, the S&P 500 measures the performance
of the market by averaging the performance of the 500 largest domestic
companies weighted in proportion to the market capitalization (total equity
101. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
102. Still, the fees associated with maintaining a brokerage account are likely to be much
higher than those for investing in ain index fund. See MALKIEL, supra note 6, at 359 (stating index
funds have lower fees than other types of investments, including actively managed funds).
Moreover, as discussed further below, it is important to monitor the mix of stocks in one's portfolio
to be sure that it remains balanced according to market capitalization. With an index fund, the fund
managers do the monitoring for a minimal fee because there is little judgment or discretion involved
in indexing. See Palmiter & Taha, supra note 14, at 986. This suggests another subtle advantage of
index funds. Since investing in stocks according to market capitalization is a purely ministerial task
that can be reduced to a simple formula and loaded into a computer, which also saves on expenses,
there is little danger that fund managers will diverge from the avowed strategy. See FRANKEL &
SCHWING, supra note 14, § 31.02[J], at 31-101 to -102. In contrast, it is a known practice for
advisers of actively managed funds to sell losers and buy winners in advance of reporting portfolio
composition in order to appear savvier to investors. Booth, De Suitability Rule, supra note 96, at
1608 n.39. Such window-dressing, as the practice is known, adds to turnover and operating
expenses. Id. Moreover, the herd mentality implicit in such practices may result in a fund taking
more losses than it should and paying too much for the stocks that it buys. Index funds avoid these
hidden costs of active management by the simple expedient of confining adviser discretion. See,
e.g., Shefali Anand, Tight-Fisted Investing, WALL ST. J., May 4. 2009, at R3 (discussing the
importance of keeping fees low). But see Aaron Lucchetti, What Ails Index Funds and How to Fix
Direm, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2002, at RI (noting how index funds have "started to suffer from their
own popularity," with many having "'structural problems' that eat into shareholders' returns by
boosting operating costs").
103. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
105. See Glaser, supra note 63, at 696, 699.
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value) of each. 10 So index funds do not necessarily invest in indices."o Rather,
they merely follow the same logic in an effort to eliminate all company-specific
risk. 08  In other words, the point is not to invest in an index but rather to
eliminate as much risk as possible as cheaply as possible. To be sure, there is
some debate about whether the S&P 500 is the best measure of the market.
Some critics argue that the S&P 500 is too narrow, even though it reflects 85%
106. See HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 20, at 389. It is important that the average is
weighted according to size. See id. at 179. If the point is to measure the performance of the market
as a whole, it is important to factor in the relative market value of the individual companies that
compose it See id For example, if investors in the aggregate hold $372 billion in Apple and $154
billion in Coke, and both companies pay a dividend of $5 billion to stockholders, the return on
Apple is 1.34% and the return on Coke is 3.25%. The unweighted average of the two is 2.30%. But
the return of $10 billion on the total investment of $526 billion is 1.90%. Although investors might
claim that their average retun is 2.30%, clearly the overall retun on the portfolio is 1.90%. Thus, it
is vital to measure return by means of a weighted average in order to measure return accurately. See
id To measure return by a simple unweighted average is to count the return of smaller investments
too much and of larger investments too little. See id. Similarly, an investor who seeks to invest in
the market as a whole, and thus to avoid company-specific risk, should invest in stocks in
proportion to their market capitalization. To invest an equal amount in each company is in effect to
invest too much in smaller companies and too little in larger companies at least as long as the idea is
to invest in the market as a whole. See generally Carolyn Geer, Index Funds Get a fakeover,
WALL ST. 1. Feb. 7. 2011. at RI (explaining different weighting methods and their effects on index
fund performance).
107. Indeed, it is important for ain index fund to invest in substantially more (or fewer) stocks
than exactly the five hundred that compose the S&P 500 at any given time. Since the S&P 500 is,
by definition, composed of the five hundred biggest U.S. stocks as measured by market
capitalization, it follows that companies must periodically be added to and dropped from the index
as they grow and shrink. See Messod D. Beneish & Robert E. Whaley, An Anatomy of the "S&P
Gamve : The Effects ofChanging the Rules, 51 J. FINANCE 1909, 1912-13 (1996). Studies indicate
that companies that are added to the index enjoy an immediate and permanent bump up in price.
See MALKIEL, supra note 6, at 364: Honghui Chen et al., The Price Response to S&P 500 Index
Additions and Deletions: Evidence of Asmnmetrv and a New Explanation, 59 J. FINANCE 1901,
1907-09 & tbl.1 (2004). Presumably, companies that are dropped from the index suffer the
opposite effect. See id at 1910. The thinking is that this price effect is attributable to increased
demand for index stocks because of various trading strategies that involve the S&P 500 and
component stocks. See id at 1901-02, 1908. One would think that such strategies involve selling
index stocks just as often as buying them, but it may be that increased liquidity enhances the
efficiency of pricing, or at least reduces the perceived risk of mispricing. See id. at 1902-03, 1922.
In any event, if an index fund invests in stocks that are on the bubble of inclusion, it is important
also to invest in stocks that are somewhat smaller than index stocks so that when ain old index stock
is dropped, one will owvn shares in the new index stock, and the gain on the latter will offset the loss
on the former. See generally Booth, The Buzzard Was Their Friend, supra note 96, at 893-95 &
n.5 I (summarizing trading strategies and stock picking for hedge funds); Birdthistle, supra note 16,
at 80-81 (noting that investors in exchange traded funds (ETFs) and Standard & Poor's Depository
Receipts (SPDRs) may purchase and resell shares for enhanced trading liquidity). In the alternative,
ain index fund could avoid bubble stocks altogether by investing in say the four hundred largest
stocks rather than in all five hundred. Incidentally, this suggests that SPDRs are a bit riskier than
index funds. See id. at 77 ("[A]ny investor who purchased a SPDR would, in a single share, be
invested in the entire S&P 500. and the value of that SPDR would fluctuate in accordance with the
rise and fall of the S&P 500.").
108. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
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of the market by value.109  Others complain that it comprises only domestic
stocks.110 Still others argue that there are better ways to diversify, such as
according to return on equity.II But no one seems to question the method by
which the S&P 500 is maintained-by adjusting component stocks according to
market capitalization.112 Thus, for present purposes, it is not important whether
the S&P 500 is the best measure of market performance. It is the method that
matters.
109. Richard A. Booth. Why Stock Options Are the Best Form of Executive Compensation
(And How to Make Them Even Better), 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 281, 352 app. (2010). The S&P 500
measures the performance of a particular segment of the market, namely, large capitalization stocks.
See HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 20, at 389; see also MALKIEL, supra note 6, at 363 ("The
S&P 500 omits the thousands of small companies that are among the most dynamic in the
economy."). There is no doubt that small capitalization stocks tend to generate more return, but it is
important that the S&P 500 is efficiently priced and that it falls somewhere on the so-called capital
market line. See id. at 203-06. Whatever doubt there might once have been about whether the S&P
500 is efficiently priced has presumably been eliminated by program trading and SPDRs. which
provide ample opportunities for arbitrage and ultimately drive the index itself to an efficient price.
See Quentin C. Chu & Wen-Liang Gideon Hsieh, Pricing Efficiency of the S&P 500 Index Market:
Evidence from the Standard & Poor's Depositary Receipts, 22 J. FUTURES MARKETS 877, 897
(2002).
110. One response is that the biggest United States companies presumably conduct business
worldwide and invest wherever they can maximize return. So there is no a priori reason to think
that a portfolio that includes a dollop of foreign stocks should do any better than the S&P 500. On
the other hand, United States stocks are presumably subject to certain country risks that are unique
to the United States. Evidence on this question is somewhat mixed. Some sources suggest that
international markets tend to follow the United States market, or perhaps vice versa, while other
sources seem to show that portfolios with a healthy dose of foreign stocks do better than purely
domestic portfolios. See, e.g.. Burton G. Malkiel, Op-Ed., 'Buy and Hold' Is Still a Winner, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 18, 2010, at A23 ("Even though portfolios in the U.S. market actually lost money in the
first decade of the 21st century, emerging-market stocks enjoyed returns of more than 10% per year.
Every portfolio should have substantial holdings in the fast-growing emerging economies of the
world."). But it is always possible that they do so because they entail more risk. One question that
tends to be ignored in most such studies is how much to invest in foreign stocks. See id. In most
cases, the assumption seems to be that some nice, round amount like 30% should be invested in
foreign stock. But see MALKIEL, supra note 6. at 365-66 & tbl. (recommending an index fund
portfolio including 16% investment in international stocks). But by the logic of index investing,
presumably one should invest in a global portfolio of stocks according to the market capitalization
of each, presumably as measured in dollars. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
111. See John C. Bogle, Op-Ed., Talue' Strategies, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2007, at Al l; Geer,
supra note 106, at RI; Jeremy J. Siegel, Op-Ed., Die "Noisy Market" Hypothesis, WALL ST. J.,
June 14, 2006, at A14; John Spence, Bogle and Siegel Clash Over Ideas for Index Funds. WALL ST.
J., Aug. 21, 2006. at C7: see also Joanna L. Ossinger. The Dimensions of a Pioneering Strategy,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2006, at RI (discussing efforts to find or create alternative indices).
112. Although Standard & Poors also maintains an equal-weighted version of the S&P 500,
there is an obvious inconsistency in identifying stocks by market capitalization and investing an
equal amount in each. See S&P 500 Equal Weight Index Factsheet, S&P Dow JONES INDICES, http:
//www.spindices.com/indices/'equity/sp-500-equal-weighted (follow "Factsheet" hyperlink, then
click "S&P 500 Equal Weight Index Factsheet" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 25, 2012).
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B. Index Funds and Trading
Although a diversified buy-and-hold strategy appears to be the best strategy
for most investors, it is nonetheless necessary to do some trading for purposes of
portfolio balancing.' If a fund fails to rebalance its portfolio periodically, it is
inevitable that some stocks will become overweighted while others will become
underweighted, with the result that the portfolio will take on unnecessary risk. 114
Thus, there is a certain amount of trading implicit even in the maintenance of an
index. For example, annual turnover in the S&P 500 is about 6%, owing to
changes in the market capitalization and identity of component stocks.116
Moreover, an index fund (like any other fund) must buy or sell depending on
whether investor cash is flowing into or out of the fund. 1 The index itself has
no investors and thus need not worry about investing new cash and paying
investors who want to cash out. So there is a bit more trading implicit in the
management of an index fund. For example, average annual turnover among
Vanguard index funds is about 14% Per year.118 Finally, some trading may be
desirable as a matter of tax planning.
Since the typical index fund trades primarily for purposes of portfolio
balancing in order to hold shares in proportion to their market capitalization, an
index fund typically buys additional shares of portfolio stocks that have risen in
value and sells shares of portfolio stocks that have fallen in value relative to
other portfolio stocks. 120 It follows that when an index fund trades, it almost
always buys a few additional shares of a stock that it already owns or it sells a
113. See Booth, The Buzzard Wias Their Friend, supra note 96, at 894 n.51.
114. See Booth, The Suitability Rule, supra note 96, at 1613 & n1.57.
115. Id.
116. See Booth, Class Conflict, supra note 7, at 713 (citing Booth, The Buzzard Was Their
Friend, supra note 96, at 897).
117. Thus, there is an important difference between an indexed mutual fund and an ETF.
Compare Mutual Funds, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.govinswers/muttind.htn
(last modified Dec. 14, 2010) (mutual fund investors cannot purchase mutual fund shares from other
investors on a secondary market), with Exchange- Traded Funds (ETFs), U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/etf.htm (last modified Dec. 14. 2010) (ETF investors can
purchase mutual thnd shares from other investors on a secondary market), and Closed-End Funds,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMN, http:/www.sec. govian swers/mfclose.htm (last modified May 7, 2007)
(closed-end funds invest in more illiquid securities than mutual funds on the secondary market), and
Unit Investment Trusts (UJTs), U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.go-/answers/uit.htm
(last modified May 8, 2007) (unit investment trusts do not actively trade portfolios).
118. See Booth. The Buzzard Was Their Friend. supra note 96, at 897.
119. See MALKIEL, supra note 6. at 361: Booth, The Buzzard 'as Their Friend, supra note
96, at 894 n.51.
120. See supra note 16. To be sure, a stock that rises in value should rise in market
capitalization proportionally, and vice versa, other things equal. But it is quite possible for a stock
to increase in value even as market capitalization decreases, as when a company repurchases its ownvi
shares. See, e.g., Booth, Aysteries of Cotporate Finance, supra note 94, at 1087 ("It is well known
that companies often repurchase their own stock in order to support or increase the market price.").
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few shares of a stock that it continues to hold. 121 Thus, an index fund usually
holds many more shares than the number it buys or sells.
C. Index Funds and Securities Fraud Class Actions
Again, holders effectively pay buyers in a securities fraud class action,'2
and index funds almost always hold more shares than they buy.123 It follows that
index funds almost always lose more than they recover as a result of securities
fraud class actions. In other words, the additional loss suffered by index funds
from payout to buyers almost always exceeds the amount that the index fund
recovers as a result of any settlement. If an index fund stands to lose more
than it gains, the fund should presumably be opposed to certification of the
action as a class action-indeed, the fund arguably has a duty to its holders to
oppose certification in any such case.125
Table 1 sets forth the various combinations of gains and losses a fund might
face where the defendant company suffers a loss in value from $10 per share to
$9 per share, not including any further feedback loss from the effects of a
securities fraud class action. Since the feedback effect depends on the size of the
plaintiff class,126 the columns show the effects of various class sizes ranging
from 10% to 80% of outstanding shares as set forth in the top row. For clarity,
the first row of numbers in the body of the table sets forth the fundamental loss
of $1 per share that buyers and holders would suffer in the absence of a
securities fraud class action. The second row shows the effect of class size on
the total loss suffered by buyers who bought at $10 per share.12 This is the
121. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. An index fund that follows an index
religiously, such as SPDRs do, would presumably trade all or nothing when stocks are added to or
deleted from the index. See supra note 107. But in practice, index funds are not so devout, holding
portfolios that are a good deal larger than the S&P 500 presumably in part to avoid the need for
unnecessary trading at the edges. Cf supra note 109 (explaining that the opportunities for arbitrage
provided by program trading and SPDRs tend to drive the S&P 500 to an efficient price).
122. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
124. See infra Tables 1 & 2. To be sure, there may be some exceptional cases where the fund
is a buyer of an unusually large portion of shares, such as when the market value of a fi-aud-affected
stock increases dramatically during the fraud period. See intra Tables I & 2. For example, if a
stock's net value doubles over the market as a whole, then all other things equal, ain index fund will
double its holdings in that stock.
125. See, e.g., Booth, Class Conflict, supra note 7, at 772 (arguing that ain index tund has a
"fiduciary duty to its investors to serve their interests"; therefore, "the tund should decide how to
proceed based on the interests of the fund as a wvhole").
126. Id. at 706 & n.8.
127. Again, the effect of feedback depends on the number of shares in the plaintiff class. Id.
'The greater the number of shares represented, the greater the effect of feedback because the payout
by the defendant company causes a further loss in value. Id But the process eventually reaches a
limit. Assuming that the plaintiff class recovers fully, the total loss in value with feedback is:
total loss with feedback =fundamental loss - (I -percentage of damaged shares)
Id. app. at 768.
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amount per share of the plaintiff class claim. The third row shows the amount of
feedback damages per share, which is the difference between the fundamental
loss and the total loss with feedback." This is also the loss per share suffered
by holders because the company is liable. The fourth row shows the net per
share recovery of the plaintiff class after average attorney fees of 20%. Finally,
the body of Table 1 shows the recovery and loss for an investor who holds 1,000
shares at the time of corrective disclosure for various combinations of shares
bought during the fraud period and shares held before the fraud Veriod-ranging
from zero bought and 1,000 held to 500 bought and 500 held. For example,
In Table 1, the formula is applied to the dollar loss. Thus, if 50% of shares are represented in
the plaintiff class, the loss is:
$1.00 - (1.00- 0.50) 5 1.00 . 0.50 = $2.00
The formula may be applied equally well to the percentage loss. For further explanation and
derivation of the formula, see Booth, THe End of the Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 3,
app. at 35-36. Feedback depends on the actual payout by the defendant company, or the prospect
thereof. Id. at 8. If the company settles for less than the total claim asserted by the plaintiff class,
as is typical, the feedback effect will be accordingly reduced. See id. at 20 22. Accordingly, class
size should be estimated as the number of damaged shares multiplied by the expected percentage
recovery. See id. at 20, 35. For example, if the plaintiff class comprises 40% of outstanding shares
and the company pays out claims at fifty cents on the dollar, the effect is the same as if the class of
20% recovers in lull.
Another real world problem is that there is no good way to determine the number of shares
represented in the plaintiff class short of litigating the case and soliciting claims. See generally
Robert A. Alessi, The Emerging Judicial Hostility to the Typical Damages Model Employed by
Plaintisj in Securities Class Action Lawsuits, 56 BuS. LAW. 483, 483 (2001) (noting the
"increasing judicial skepticism over the viability of plaintiffs' class action damages model," swhich
employs "sweeping assumptions, suspect methodologies, and unfounded conclusions"). Trading
volume is no indication of class size since many shares in the plaintiff class may have been traded
numerous times during the fraud period. See id. at 484-85 (noting that "a share traded may have a
much greater than proportional probability of being re-traded during the Class Period due to the
disproportionate influence on trading of short-term traders, arbitrageurs, and similar market
participants" (quoting in re Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176, (N.D. Cal. 1993))). On the other
hand. we do know that average turnover among mutual funds is about 58% per year. INV. Co.
INST., supra note 83, at 28 fig.2.6. We also know that active stock-picking, or price-discovery
trading, is limited to about 25% of the market, which is consistent with the fact that mutual funds
hold about one-third of all equities and that about three-quarters of all equities are held in well-
diversified funds or accounts. See Booth, The Buzzard 'as Their Friend, snpra note 96, at 894 &
n.51. Assuming that market-wide turnover is about 300% per year and that 7 5 % of shares trade at a
60% turnover rate-roughly equal to that of mutual funds-it follows that 25% of shares trade at a
turnover rate of 240%. Given that the average class period is about 300 days-five-sixths of a
year-it seems likely that the average class comprises 50% of outstanding shares as held by less
active traders and 25% of shares as held by more active traders for a total of 75% of outstanding
shares. Since some less active traders will happen to have engaged in some in-and-out trading
during the class period, this number is probably a bit on the high side. See Costello v. Oppenheimer
& Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 13 69 n.9 (198 3 ) ("The term 'in and out' trading denotes the sale of all or part
of a customer's portfolio, with the money reinvested in other securities, followed by the sale of the
newly acquired securities.").
128. See supra note 127.
129. See supra notes 4, 7 and accompanying text.
130. Although the table could be extended to include combinations up to zero shares held and
one thousand shares purchased, there is no point in doing so since investors who buy more shares
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for an investor who bought 100 shares and held 900 shares in a securities fraud
class action in which the plaintiff class comprises 10% of the outstanding shares,
the gain from recovery would be $89, and the loss from feedback would be $100
for a net loss of $11. Note that where the net result is negative, the numbers
are shown in bold. As is apparent from the chart, combinations falling in the
northeast half of the Table-above the separator (***)-result in net losses for
the investor.
than they hold always benefit from a securities fraud class action for class sizes up to 80% of
outstanding shares. Moreover, the table could be extended to include classes larger than 80% of
outstanding shares, but so large a class is almost inconceivable. Indeed, with a class of 90% of
outstanding shares, a mere 10% price drop results in a stock price of zero with feedback. But a
company that is worth zero is presumably bankrupt and thus judgment-proof.
131. See infra Table 1.
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TABLE 1. EFFECT OF CLASS SIZE ON FEEDBACK LOSS
RELATED TO SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS
Class Size 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Fundamental Loss 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
With Feedback 1.11 1.25 1.43 1.67 2.00 2.50 3.33 5.00
Excess 0.11 0.25 0.43 0.67 1.00 1.50 2.33 4.00
Net Recovery (80%) 0.89 1.00 1.14 1.33 1.60 2.00 2.67 4.00
B1TY (recovery) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HOLD (excess loss) 1000 111 250 429 667 1,000 1,500 2,333 4,000
NET -111 -250 -429 -667 -1,000 -1,500 -2,333 -4,000
B1W (recovery) 100 89 100 114 133 160 200 267 400
HOLD (excess loss) 900 100 225 386 600 900 1_350 2,100 3,600
NET -11 -125 -271 -467 -740 -1,150 -1,833 -3,200
BUY (recovey) 200 178 200 229 267 320 400 533 800
HOLD (excess loss) 800 89 200 343 533 800 1,200 1,867 3,200
NET 89 0 -114 -267 -480 -800 -1,333 -2,400
BUY (recovery) 300 267 300 34 400 480 600 800 1,200
HOLD (excess loss) 700 78 175 300 467 700 1,050 1,633 2,800
NET 189 125 43 -67 -220 -450 -833 -1,600
B1TY (recovery) 400 356 400 457 533 640 800 1,067 1,600
HOLD (excess loss) 600 67 150 257 400 600 900 1,400 2,400
NET 289 250 200 133 40 -100 -333 -800
B1TY (recovery) 500 444 500 571 667 800 1.000 1,333 2,000
HOLD (excess loss) 500 56 125 214 333 500 750 1,167 2,000
NET 389 375 357 333 250 167 0
As Table 1 shows, an index fund is likely to be a net loser in the most
probable scenarios. Assuming a turnover rate of 14% o-a recent average of eight
major Vanguard general stock index funds 32 an index fund will be a net loser
except where the class is quite small and the fund has engaged in unusually
heavy trading.1 33 If we refine Table 1 to show the results for turnover rates
between 10% and 20% as shown in Table 2, it appears that the fund will lose at
turnover rates up to 18% where the class consists of 20% of the outstanding
shares. 134  Thus, except when the plaintiff class is quite small, the fund loses
more from feedback than it gains from recovery.
132. See Booth, The Buzzard Wfas Their Friend, supra note 96, at 897.
133. See supra Table 1. It would be quite unusual for an index fund to double its holdings in a
given stock since that would imply that the company itself has doubled in value except (obviously)
where the index fund is a first time buyer of the subject stock.
134. See infra Table 2.
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TABLE 2. EFFECT OF CLASS SIZE ON FEEDBACK LOSS RELATED TO SECURITIES
FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS LIMITED To TURNOV ER RATES BETWEEN 10% AND 20%
Class Size 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Fundamental Loss 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
With Feedback 1.11 1.25 1.43 1.67 2.00 2.50 3.33 5.00
Excess 0.11 0.25 0.43 0.67 1.00 1.50 2.33 4.00
Net Recovery (80O) 0.89 1.00 1.14 1.33 1.60 2.00 2.67 4.00
BUY (recovery) 100 89 100 114 133 160 200 267 400
HOLD (excess loss) 900 100 225 386 600 900 1.350 2.100 3.600
NET -11 -125 -271 -467 -740 -1,150 -1,833 -3,200
BUY (recovery) 120 107 120 137 160 192 240 320 480
HOLD (excess loss) 880 98 220 377 587 880 1.320 2.053 3.520
NET 9 -100 -240 -427 -688 -1,080 -1,733 -3,040
BUY (recovery) 140 124 140 160 187 224 280 373 560
HOLD (excess loss) 860 96 215 369 573 860 1,290 12007 3.440
NET 29 -75 -209 -387 -636 -1,010 -1,633 -2,880
BUY(recovery) 160 142 160 183 213 256 320 427 640
HOLD (excess loss) 840 93 210 360 560 840 1,260 1,960 3,360
NET 49 -50 -177 -347 -584 -940 -1,533 -2,720
BUY(recovery) 180 160 180 206 240 288 360 480 720
HOLD (excess loss) 820 91 205 351 547 820 1,230 1,913 3,280
NET 69 -25 -146 -307 -532 -870 -1,433 -2,560
BUY (recovery) 200 178 200 229 267 320 400 533 800
HOLD (excess loss) 800 89 200 343 533 800 1,200 1,867 3,200
NET 89 0 -114 -267 -480 -800 -1,333 -2,400
Based on the foregoing analysis, it seems clear that index funds usually lose
more than they gain from securities fraud class actions. The only scenario in
which an index fund might benefit from a class action is an unlikely situation in
which the class is small but the fund has traded quite actively.
135. Both Thakor and Davis-Evans assume in their studies that funds engage in all or nothing
trading. Neither study considers holder losses. See, e.g.. THAKOR ET AL., supra note 11. at 1 n.2
(explaining that study focuses on the buying and selling of securities). Note also that the foregoing
analysis, as set forth in Tables I and 2, does not reflect any financial benefit that might redound to
investors from recovery by the corporation.
136. See supra Tables 1 & 2. Again, there is no good way to know the size of the plaintiff
class up front. See supra note 127. So it is conceivable that an index fund might be a relatively
large net buyer of a stock that has increased dramatically in price even where the class turns out to
be relatively small because most of the trading is attributable to in-and-out trading. See supra note
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IV. DERIVATIVE ACTIONS VERSUS CLASS ACTIONS
How should index funds respond to the costs foisted on them by securities
fraud class actions? To be sure, the rules governing securities fraud class actions
provide that a member of the plaintiff class can always opt out. But, in doin
so, one would forgo any recovery and still suffer the loss from feedback.
Indeed, the Tables above quantify these effects. For example, if the plaintiff
class comprises 30% of the outstanding shares, and an index fund holds 800
shares and buys 200 shares, the fund will lose $114 if it remains in the class, but
it will lose $343 if it opts out. 140 Clearly, it does no good to opt out.141
A better way for index funds to respond is to oppose certification of the case
as a class action. Under FRCP Rule 23(c), the court must certify that the case is
appropriate for class action treatment, and any member of the plaintiff class may
be heard on the matter.142 There are several well-recognized grounds on which
an index fund might oppose certification, but the best argument is that the
representative plaintiff cannot adequately represent a class that includes buyer-
holders-such as index funds-that would prefer the action be dismissed. 143The
127. But assuming that average turnover for index funds is about 14%, that the average turnover
among all mutual funds is about 58%, and that the little in-and-out trading is attributable to either, it
seems unlikely that an index fund will often account for more than about one-quarter of the plaintiff
class. In other words, if an index fund has increased its holdings by 25%, say from 800 shares to
1,000 shares, it is likely that managed mutual funds have increased their holdings by at least the
same percentage, if not more, such that the plaintiff class will represent a large percentage of the
shares outstanding-after all, there are only so many shares to go around. Incidentally, many
ordinary. managed. non-index mutual funds or fund families will find that they too fall in the red
zone. A single corporate investment adviser may manage nurmerous funds within a fund family.
See Norm Champ, Deputy Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n., Speech to the New York City Bar, Wi'hat SEC Registration Means for Hedge Fund
Advisors (May 11, 2012), available at http://www.sec.govinews/speech/2012/spch5l1112nc.htm
(demonstrating that one investment advisor may manage more than one fund). thus, the decision
whether to support or oppose a class action may be made on the basis of the interests of several
funds in the aggregate rather than fund-by-fund. See id. If so, it is much more likely that non-index
funds will find that their interests coincide with those of index funds.
137. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v).
138. See Booth. Class Conflict, supra note 7, at 715.
139. See supra Tables 1 & 2.
140. See supra Table 1.
141. On the other hand, some investors may be tempted to opt out in order to seek a bigger
recovery that need not be shared with other class members and to avoid many of the onerous class
action requirements added by Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). See Booth, Class
Conflict, supra note 7, at 747 & n. 100. As discussed further below, this opportunistic strategy foists
additional costs on other stockholders, including both holders and buyers who remain in the class,
whether out of necessity or otherwise. See infra Part IV.D.
142. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A), (c)(2)(B)(iv).
143. See Booth, Class Conflict, supra note 7, at 701, 742. In the alternative, one could argue
that the claims of a buyer-only plaintiff are atypical if a majority of the class consists of buyer-
holders. See id. at 749. In addition, one could argue that index funds eschew reliance on the
integrity of the market, seeking instead to avoid the risk of mispricing through diversification, and
thus cainnot be included in a class of investors presumed to rely on the integrity of the market under
292 [VOL. 64: 265
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named plaintiff may respond that she does not seek to represent the interests of
holders and may thus seek to define the class in such a way as to exclude all
buyer-holders or any buyer-holder who would be a net loser from the class
action.1 But it is not clear that a representative plaintiff may gerrymander the
class in such a way.145 More important, it is not clear that a class as so defined is
the fraud on the market theory as adopted in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988).
See Booth, Class Coiflict, supra note 7, at 749-51.
144. See Booth, Class Coiflict, supra note 7, at 745.
145. See id. Defining the class as investors who favor prosecution of the action comes close to
a prohibited opt-in action since it effectively leaves individual buyers to decide whether to join the
class. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)-(c)(2) (of the three types of class actions authorized under FRCP
Rule 23, two are mandatory and the other allows class member exclusion only upon request). It is
arguable that everyone wlio may have a claim should have access to a class action remedy, if only
to express a preference about whether the action should proceed, which in turn suggests that
plaintiffmay not unreasonably limit the definition of the class. See id. In any event, the law is clear
that opt-in actions are prohibited under Rule 23(c). See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c); see also, e.g., Kern v.
Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[S]ubstantial legal authority supports the view
that by adding the 'opt out requirement to Rule 23 in the 1966 amendments, Congress prohibited
'opt in' provisions by implication."). This is not to say that an opt-in action might not make sense.
They are standard practice in the European Union where those who choose to opt in must agree to
pay their share of attorney fees. See Tiana Leia Russell, Exporting Class Actions to the European
Union, 28 B.U. INTL L.J. 141, 178-79 (2010) (citing Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Shift Happens:
Pressure on Foreign Attorney-Fee Paradigns from Class Actions, 13 DUKE J. COMP1'. & INT'L L.
125. 128 (2003)). The class plaintiff may also argue that she represents buyer-holders only as
buyers. See Booth, Class Conflict, supra note 7. at 745. This argument raises a related,
fundamental question about class actions-whether a class plaintiff must represent the interests of
real people or isolate the interests that are consistent with the class claim. See generally Elizabeth
Chamblee Burch. Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. REv. 1109, 1127-29 (2011) [hereinafter,
Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintu] (discussing due process concerns relating to the lead plaintiffs
representation of class interests). Needless to say, individuals often choose not to sue for all sorts of
reasons even wvhen they have good claims. So it is not clear that anyone can represent the interests
of a class that includes members who in isolation would choose to not sue. See Hansberry v. Lee,
311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940) (explaining that the selection of a class representative "whose substantial
interests are not necessarily or even probably the same as those whom they are deemed to represent,
does not afford that protection to absent parties wvhich due process requires"). On the other hand, it
is arguable that most buyers would choose to sue or remain in a plaintiff class if any individual
buyer chooses to sue or the class action goes forward. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying
text. This suggests that individual or opt-out actions should also be prohibited. That seems
unlikely. as does any rule that would undo the fraud on the market presumption. Basic Inc., 485
U.S. at 241-42. As discussed further below, there is a more promising approach focusing on the
portion of class claims that are in fact losses suffered by the corporation and that should be
addressed first as derivative claims. See infra Part IV.A. In other words, buyers should be
precluded from individual recovery at least as against the corporation, even by means of ain
individual opt-out action, on the theory that the cost is foisted on other stockholders. See Smith v.
Waste Mgmt., Inc., 407 F.3d 381, 385-86 (5th Cir. 2005) ("Requiring derivative enforcement of
claims belonging in the first instance to the corporation also prevents an individual shareholder from
incurring a benefit at the expense of other shareholders similarly situated." (quoting Cowin v.
Bresler, 741 F.2d 410, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Bangor
Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 417 U.S. 703, 721-22 (1974) ("[A]ny recovery
obtained in [a derivative] action would belong to the corporation, not to the minority shareholders as
individuals, for the shareholder in a derivative action enforces not his own individual rights, but
rights which the corporation has.").
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ultimately ascertainable. 14  As is apparent from Tables 1 and 2, the interests of
potential class members change as the size of the class changes. As the class
gets smaller, more buyer-holders might favor certification. But that would
increase the size of the class and prompt many buyer-holders to oppose
certification.147  The numbers may equilibrate somewhere, but it is difficult to
say where that would be.148 Still, one potential problem with the foregoing
argument is that holders have no standing to sue and thus may have no standing
to object on grounds that relate to their status as holders. 149 In any event, the
courts may be disinclined to give much weight to arguments that merely seek to
deny a remedy to other litigants.
The best way for an index fund to oppose a class action is to advocate for a
derivative action. (The best defense is a good offense.) As noted above, when
buyers sue for securities fraud, their losses-all of which are impounded in the
lower stock price of the defendant company-may come from three sources: (1)
lower expected return, (2) higher cost of capital, and (3) enforcement losses,
including costs suffered by the defendant company such as attorney fees and
other expenses of litigation, civil and criminal fines, and damages or settlement
amounts payable to buyers. so Moreover, an increase in the cost of capital may
come from two sources. It may be the result of a market perception of more risk
inherent in the business of the subject company. Or it may be the result of harm
to the reputation of the subject company resulting from the fraud-a loss of
trust.'15 In a securities fraud class action all of these losses are represented in the
146. See Miles v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig.). 471 F.3d 24,
42, 45 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that although separate inquiry from class certification rules, a class
must be sufficiently ascertainable).
147. See supra note 127 and Tables 1 & 2.
148. The class plaintiff might also argue that the class should be defined to include only
buyers who did not own any shares at the beginning of the class period. See Coffee, supra note 12,
at 1556-57. There are two potential problems with so defining the class: First, there may be too few
such buyers to justify a class action. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) (requiring that class members be
so numerous that joinder is impractical). And even if there are a substantial number of such
investors, it is likely to be a much smaller universe than a class of all buyers, including buyer
holders, and possibly so small that the incentive for a plaintiffs lawyer to represent such a class
would be insufficient to justify prosecution of the action. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 246 F.3d
201, 254-55 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing the attorney client tension with respect to ideal plaintiff
class size). Second, it is not clear how one could monitor the composition of any such class. Some
buyer-holders might attempt to join the class even though they do not fall within the definition,
figuring that they need not disclose the fact that they are also holders. See supra note 143.
Although there may be nothing inherently wrong with permitting all buyers into the class, buyer
holder interlopers might dilute the recovery for buyer-only class members if the settlement pot is
negotiated accordingly. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(4) (2006) ("The share of any final judgment or of
any settlement that is awarded to a representative party serving on behalf of a class shall be equal,
on a per share basis, to the portion of the final judgment or settlement awarded to all other members
of the class.").
149. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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aggregate decrease in stock price.152 But enforcement and reputation losses are
clearly derivative in nature. They affect all stockholders-both buyers and
holders-in the same way because they are harms that are suffered in the first
instance by the corporation. In other words, stockholders lose because the
corporation has suffered a loss, and their stock has declined in value.154
Derivative actions avoid the problems of feedback and circularity. 1 When
the corporation recovers from individual wron doers, the stockholders recover
because their stock rises in value accordingly. Thus, an index fund should
clearly favor a derivative action over a class action. In a successful derivative
action, the fund gains from a recovery in stock price, whereas in a successful
class action, the fund usually loses because of feedback.'57
The law is quite clear: claims that can be asserted by the corporation must be
asserted by the corporation, and the) must be asserted before any individual
stockholders may assert direct claims.158 The inescapable implication is that the
losses suffered by the corporation from reputational harm and enforcement costs
must be liti ated and settled before the losses to individual stockholders may be
addressed.
152. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
156. See Booth, The End ofthe Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 3, at 24.
157. See supra Tables I & 2. As discussed turther below, a fund need not file a separate
derivative action. This is because the court must both certify a class action and specify its type, and
because a derivative action is a type of class action, meaning an index fund may intervene at the
certification hearing and argue that the action should be treated as a derivative action. See FED. R.
Cly. P. 23(c)(1)(C); infia Part IV.C. Indeed, the court could do so on its own motion. See, e.g.,
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct 2541, 2562 (2011) ("[M]ost issues arising under Rule
23 ... [are] committed in the first instance to the discretion of the district court." (quoting Califano
v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 703 (1979))).
158. See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 2004): see
also LaSala v. Bordier et Cie. 519 F.3d 121, 130 n1.9 (3d Cir. 2008) ("Delaware law generally does
not allow shareholders to assert breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims directly, unless the shareholders
can show damage distinct from the damage to the corporation." (citing Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1034)).
It is not clear that there should be a cause of action for the other two types of damages. The
decrease in price from new information about fundamentals is a loss that will happen one way or
another-as in musical chairs, the only question is the timing. See Booth, ie End ofthe Securities
Fraud Class Action, supra note 3, at 10 & n.21. But diversified investors are indifferent to such
losses because they gain as often as they lose. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Finally,
feedback damages arise only because the company pays. If there is no remedy for fundamental loss,
there is no feedback. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text. On the other hand, if we retain
a remedy for fundamental loss, then feedback is another form of loss suffered by the corporation as
a result of securities litigation. It is a loss that is suffered by all of the stockholders, and the
company should also have a claim against the individual wrongdoers for compensation.
Paradoxically, recovery for this derivative loss would eliminate feedback in the end-yet another
form of circularity. In short, by process of elimination, no claim remains against the defendant
corporation-all that remains are claims by the corporation against individual wrongdoers. The
bottom line is that securities fraud should be seen as derivative rather than direct.
159. See supra note 158.
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A. Derivative Actions and Deterrence
Before digging into the details of the legal arguments against class
certification and in favor of a derivative action, it is important to address some
obvious-but answerable-objections to litigating securities fraud by means of
derivative action.
First, while most scholars agree that securities fraud class actions ill-serve
investors, many argue that, as an important deterrent to fraud, investors would be
worse off without such a remedy.16 Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that
private securities litigation is an important supplement to enforcement by the
SEC and other government agencies that do not have the resources to optimally
police fraud.161  But there is no reason why private enforcement must take the
form of a class action. The threat of a derivative action is also a deterrent to
fraud.162 Indeed, since the only genuine harm that flows from securities fraud is
derivative in nature. the threat of a derivative action is perfectly proportional to
the wrongful behavior to be deterred.163 In conTrast, a class action entails
excessive deterrence since it overcompensates buyers by including within the
measure of damages losses that investors can diversify away. 164 Thus, a class
action remedy offers a windfall to investors and induces too many lawsuits.I1s
160. See Coffee, supra note 12, at 1572, 1586; Rose, supra note 23. at 1309.
161. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308. 313 (2007). Although it
seems possible, and even likely, that fraud might increase in the absence of a class action remedy
there does not appear to be any data supporting this proposition. See, e.g.. Fisch, supra note 23, at
338 (explaining that some critics of the deterrence justification for securities fraud class actions
"observe that securities litigation does not deter individual wrongdoers because they do not pay
damages'-the corporation does). Moreover, this justification ignores the costs associated with
enforcement. See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 313 ("Private securities fraud actions ... can be
employed abusively to impose substantial costs on companies and individuals whose conduct
conforms to the law."). There can be no doubt that the threat of a class action increases the risk
associated with voluntary disclosure. Cf Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309,
1322 (2011) ("Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule lOb-5." (quoting
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988))). It may well be that investors would prefer
more disclosure to a class action remedy. See, e.g., id. at 1321 ("The question remains whether a
reasonable investor would have viewed the nondisclosed information 'as having significantly
altered the "total mix" of information made available.' (quoting Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 232)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
162. Booth, Class Coiflict, supra note 7, at 702; see also Thomas M. Jones, An Empirical
Examination of the Incidence of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 1971-1978, 60
B.U. L. REv. 306, 306 (1980) (stating that shareholder suits include derivative and class action
lawsuits, both of which deter fraud).
163. See supra note 158.
164. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
165. Deterrence alone cannot justify a remedy that serves no compensatory purpose. See Janet
Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions. 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1502
(1996) ("The justification for damages must then be stated purely in terms of deterrence or
retribution, not compensation."). But see Coffee, supra note 12, at 1547 ("But if the securities class
action fails as a mechanism for compensation, it can still perform admirably as a form of
deterrence."). When the plaintiff in a simple tort action sues for compensation, the fact that the
296 [VOL. 64: 265
32
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 2 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss2/3
INDEX FUNDS AND SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION
Second, another likely objection is that the individual defendants in any
derivative action-directors and officers-may seek to hide behind the business
judgment rule by arguing that they sought only to serve the corporation's best
interests.166 Although their actions may have turned out to be fraud as a matter
of federal securities law. individual defendants will argue that they acted in good
faith and thus cannot be held liable for any breach of fiduciary duty.167
Accordingly, the corporation may seek to dismiss the action as unlikely to
defendant must pay also happens to deter future reckless acts precisely in proportion to the harm
that they may cause. See Mathie v. Fries. 121 F.3d 808, 817 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that the purpose
of punitive damages "is to punish wrongdoer and deter others"). If the victim suffers no loss, there
is nothing to deter. See Cooper Distrib. Co. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 63 F.3d 262, 281 (3d Cir.
1995) ("[A] plaintiff must suffer injury to recover punitive damages."). Moreover, to provide a
remedy in excess of the harm suffered will inevitably result in frivolous lawsuits with random
deterrent effects. See generally Suja A. Thomas, Frivolous Cases, 59 DEPAUL L. REv. 633, 637
(2010) (explaining that damages caps, which limit actual and punitive damages, are used to deter
frivolous lawsuits). This explains, at least in part, why Congress found it necessary to include in the
PSLRA enhanced provisions designed to punish frivolous lawsuits. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006);
see also LaSala v. Bordier et Cie, 519 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing S. REP. No. 104-98, at
35 (1995)) (explaining that Congress intended the PSLRA to allow courts to more easily dismiss
abusive, frivolous securities class actions). But the real problem is that class actions offer recovery
for losses that investors would incur even in the absence of fraud-losses that arise because of risks
inherent in business and investing. Booth, Class Conflict, supra note 7, at 764 & n.140. In other
words, since buyers may be able to recover not onIy for the loss that arises from fraud but also for
the loss that would have occurred fraud or no fraud a class action remedy induces investors to sue
more often than they should. See id.
The prospect of a derivative action against the individual wrongdoers replaces the deterrent
that most scholars agree is the only real justification for securities fraud class actions. See supra
note 23 and accompanying text. Moreover, since a derivative remedy would eliminate recovery for
the decrease in market price that will happen one way or another, the potential recovery is much
more in line with the true economic loss fiom securities fraud. It is also much more amenable to
accurate measurement, since in a class action there is no good way to estimate the number of
damaged shares, which should facilitate more efficient settlement. See Booth, Class Conflict, supra
note 7. at 757 n.122. Even if these claims are ultimately covered by insurance, it is the company
that will recover. See supra note 30. Thus, the very idea of insurance and indemnification is
transformed into one in which the company seeks to insure itself, for its own benefit, against the
possibility of management malfeasance. See supra Part II. Incidentally, company self-insurance is
likely to improve corporate governance, which some commentators have suggested is the only
remaining justification for securities fraud class actions. See William W. Bratton & Michael L.
Wachter, 7he Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 69, 121 (2011)
(explaining how fraud on the market litigation benefits corporate governance by forcing
transparency and reducing barriers to shareholder and manager agency relationships).
166. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citing Kaplan v. Centex Corp.,
284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971); Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Ref. Corp., 126 A. 46 (Del. Ch.
1924)) ("[The business judgment rule] is a presumption that in making business decisions the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company."), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d
244, 254 (Del. 2000) (overruling Aronson only with respect to its use of an abuse of discretion
scope of review).
167. See, e.g., Brehm, 746 A.2d at 251 (discussing the "legal presumption that the [board's]
conduct was a proper exercise of business judgment" a presumption that provides "statutory
protection for a board that relies in good faith on ain expert advising the Board").
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succeed and contrary to its own best interests.168 The simple response to this
objection is that the business judgment rule does not protect a corporate fiduciary
from liability for a knowing violation of the law. And since liability under
Rule lOb-5 also requires a knowing violation of the law, where there is a Rule
1Ob-5 claim there is also a derivative claim.170 Thus, any fraud that is actionable
168. See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin. 787 A.2d 85. 98-99 (Del. 2001) (holding that court
must determine whether director defendants satisfied the entire fairness standard before determining
if they are exculpated by the business judgment rule); Brehm, 746 A.2d at 267 (dismissing the
plaintiff stockholders complaint because it failed to meet the "very large-though not
insurmountable burden" of showing that the defendants were not protected by the business
judgment rule); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 818 (reversing the lower court's denial of motion to dismiss
on the grounds that plaintiff failed "to create reasonable doubt as to the applicability of the business
judgment rule"), overruled by Brehim, 746 A.2d at 254 (overruling Aronson only with respect to its
use of an abuse of discretion scope of review); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89
(Del. 1981) (establishing a two-step test to be applied when ruling on a corporation's motion to
dismiss based on business judgment rule); see also Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880. 891 (2d Cir. 1982)
(adopting the business judgment rule and dismissing the shareholder action). See generally 2
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§7.07-.10
(1992) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE] (explaining dismissals of derivative
actions, including the procedures for requiring dismissal, and standards ofjudicial review).
169. See, e.g., In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 5215 VCG. 2011 WL
4826104, at *20 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) ("[A] fiduciary ofa Delaware corporation cannot be loyal
to a Delaware corporation by knoowingly causing it to seek profit by violating the law." (quoting In
re Massey Energy Co., No. 5430 VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *20 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011))) In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 763 (Del. Ch. 2005) (finding that actions are
made in good faith if they "do not represent a knowing violation of law or evidence a conscious and
intentional disregard of duty"). The same standard applies in connection with any exculpatory
provision under section 102(b)(7) of Delaware General Corporation Law, any argument that a
derivative action should be dismissed for failure to make a demand on the board of directors, and
any attempt to have the action voluntarily dismissed as contrary to the best interests of the
corporation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (2011).
170. To be precise, both require scienter. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007) (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976)). The
converse is not necessarily true. There may well be state claims that are not cognizable under
federal law. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977) (no claim under
Rule lOb-5 for breach of fiduciary duty in the absence of misrepresentation or omission where there
is a duty to speak). It is also conceivable that scienter might be interpreted differently under state
law from the way it is interpreted under federal law. See, e.g.. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1360
(Utah 1993) (refusing to interpret "willfully" in the Utah securities fraud statute to require
"scienter"). But this seems unlikely since the concept of scienter derives from the common law.
See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 705 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Thus, there is every reason
to think that federal and state courts will look to each other for any jurisprudence on the subject. To
be sure, different courts may rule differently on the same facts, but that is a risk even from one
federal court to another. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12 (explaining that courts have
disagreed as to wxhether negligence satisfies the scienter requirement). In the end, there is no reason
to think that scienter means something different in federal court from what it means in state court.
See Booth, Class Conflict, supra note 7, at 723 24 (explaining that the scienter requirement is the
same in federal and state courts). Thus, one subtle benefit of the approach advocated here is that it
could help clarify the meaning of scienter. In a class action, one of the first questions to be
addressed is wxhether the alleged wrongdoers acted with scienter. See Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 313
(citing Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193-94 & n. 12). The PSLRA virtually mandates an early hearing
focused on this issue. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2006). If the alleged wrongdoers did not act with
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inder federal law should also be actionable tinder state law. So there is no
reason to worry that plaintiffs may be deprived of their day in court. Thus, direct
and derivative claims are perfectly congruent.
B. Practice and Procedure
Given that a derivative action is a perfect substitute for a class action to the
extent of the genuine harm suffered by most investors in a Rule 1Ob-5 action, the
scienter, the action will be dismissed, and the decrease in price will be chalked off as an ordinary
risk that investors assume when they buy a stock. See id. 78u-4(b)(3) (stating that a court should
grant a motion to dismiss if the complaint fails to adequately plead the state of mind requirement).
In contrast, a derivative plaintiff must ultimately show that some portion of the loss was the result of
wrongdoing. See 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 168, § 7.01 (explaining
that for a derivative action to prevail, the plaintiff must show an injury or breach of duty). If the
loss is wvholly attributable to bad news and not in any part attributable to managerial misbehavior,
there is no claim even if there is evidence of scienter. See Booth. Direct and Derivative Clains in
Securities Fraud Litigation, 4 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 277, 296, 303 (2009) [hereinafter Booth,
Derivative Clains]. In a class action, the issue is never addressed in isolation because the claim is
for all of the loss from whatever source. See id. at 301. Thus, there is always a chance that the
action may proceed, even though no part of the loss is actually attributable to fraud because the
issue of scienter is addressed in a hypothetical vacuum, and because there will always be apparent
financial harm in the form of a decrease in price plus any feedback loss that may be tacked on by
the market in anticipation of class certification. See id. Therefore, in a class action, the court must
decide whether there is scienter without considering whether it gave rise to any financial harm. See
Booth, Class Conflict, supra note 7, at 722 n.39. Presumably, the courts will get it wrong in both
directions on occasion: sometimes they will find scienter even where there is no genuine financial
harm, and sometimes they will find no scienter even though there is genuine financial harm. If the
court must find both scienter and financial harm for the action to proceed, the risk of over-
deterrence and under-deterrence are both reduced. See id In other words, the need to find financial
harm acts as a double check on any finding of scienter, and vice versa. This is not to suggest that
the elements of scienter, materiality, and loss causation should somehow be merged conceptually,
but neither is it to deny that these elements are interdependent.
171. See supra note 170.
172. As noted above, the equities are somewhat different in a good-news case where buyers
gain and sellers lose. See supra notes 26, 29. In such a case, buyers may gain even more if the
corporation recovers damages in a derivative action, and sellers, who are no longer stockholders,
gain nothing from a derivative action. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. In other words,
sellers have no remedy without a class action short of any possible individual recovery in a
derivative action, but the only loss sellers suffer is the loss that goes with mispricing--a loss that
can be diversified away. Since sellers do not hold fraud-affected shares after corrective disclosure,
they do not suffer any loss from enforcement costs or increases in the cost of capital, the genuine
loss from securities fraud. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. So there is no reason to
worry that sellers have no remedy. On the other hand, one might argue that in a regime of
derivative actions there might be a perverse incentive to withhold good news for the benefit of
prospective buyers. Indeed, whry would anyone sue in such circumstances? The answer is that
good-news fraud is just as likely to cause enforcement and cost of capital losses as is bad-news
fraud. See Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 2, at 18-19; Booth,
Mysteries of Corporate Finance, supra note 94, at 1075-76. Buyers and holders thus lose in the
sense that stock price would have been even higher but for the fraud. Moreover, since the
defendants in any derivative action are the individual wrongdoers, there is no reason to think that
they will be motivated to lie to the market for the benefit of buyers.
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question becomes how to choose between the two. How should a court decide
whether an action should be treated as a derivative claim or a direct claim? As it
turns out, this too is an easy question to answer.
First, a derivative action always wins a tie. The question of whether an
action is derivative or direct arises often in corporate litigation. It is well
settled that if a claim can be litigated in a derivative action, it must be so
litigated. 14 Moreover, derivative claims must be addressed before-or, at least
logiall. ClimS175logically, prior to-any direct claims. In other words, the corporation should
recover first for any claims that it might have, and only after the corporation is
made whole should individuals recover for any remaining direct claims.' 6
Second, FRCP Rule 23(b)(3), the rule that governs class actions for
damages, requires that the court find that a class action is superior to any other
means of litigating the claim. This is not a matter of discretion: an action may
proceed as a class action only if the court certifies it by finding that it is
appropriate to proceed as such. And the court may do so only if it finds that a
class action is superior to-better than, not equal to-other ways of
proceeding.179 The Official Comments to the FRCP state unequivocally that the
rules are not intended to alter substantive law. 80 Presumably, this includes the
law relating to whether a claim is derivative or direct. In short, the court really
has no choice in the matter. If a claim is derivative, it must be litigated as
such. 8
At this point it may go without saying that a derivative action is clearly
superior to a class action. But it may be helpful to repeat here the several
reasons stated above.
First, because most investors are well diversified, the only genuine loss they
suffer from securities fraud (but for the effects of class actions) is the loss that
flows from an increase in the cost of capital owing to reputational harm or from
173. See, e.g., Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 417 U.S. 703,
721 22 (1974) ("[R]ecovery obtained in [a derivative] action would belong to the corporation, not
to the minority shareholders as individuals, for the shareholder in a derivative action enforces not
his own individual rights, but rights which the corporation has."); LaSala v. Bordier et Cie, 519 F.3d
121, 131 (3d Cir. 2008) (referring to direct and derivative claims as "two overlapping types of harm
that are treated differently by Delaware law'); Tooley v. Donaldson, Lutkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845
A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 2004) ("The decision whether a suit is direct or derivative may be outcome-
determinative.").
174. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
177. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (providing that federal rules of procedure, including the
FRCP, "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right").
181. See FED. R. Cly.P. 23(b)(3); supra note 158 andaccompanying text.
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the costs of litigation.182 Since these losses are derivative, a derivative remedy is
precisely proportional to the harm suffered by investors.m18
Second, class actions cause stock price to fall more than it otherwise would
because the company pays, thus creating collateral damage in the form of
feedback.184 In other words, class actions cause additional harm to investors and
reduce return. There is no such problem with a derivative action, by which the
company recovers from the individual wrongdoers.186
182. Whether or not ain investor chooses to diversify all investors are free to diversify and
thus able to avoid the risk that goes with being undiversified. See supra note 26 and accompanying
text. Since it is costless to diversify. investors are clearly the cheaper cost avoiders with regard to
the risk of simple mispricing. See supra note 26. Accordingly, investors should be deemed to have
assumed the risk that goes with being undiversified the risk that prices may change without notice.
As in musical chairs. an investor knows from the outset that she may be left holding the bag. At
first blush, this argument might seem to prove too much in that it suggests that diversified investors
should also be indifferent to securities fraud. After all, a diversified investor is equally likely to sell
as to buy a fraud-inflated stock, so it all comes out in the wash. This is not so. See supra note 6 and
accompanying text. Although a diversified investor is indifferent to the ups and downs of
individual stocks in normal circumstances, securities fraud aliays causes stock price to decline.
See Booth, he End of the Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 3, at 14. To return to the
example above, in which the stock of Binford Corporation might be expected to fall from S20 to
$15 because of bad news, but instead falls from $20 to $10 because of a cover-up, consider a
diversified investor who is equally likely to buy or sell Binford. See supra Part II. In the absence of
fraud, the investor has a fifty-fifty chance of a $5 loss, but where there is fraud, the investor has a
fifty-fifty chance of a $10 loss. Clearly, the investor cares about fraud. No stock ever increased in
value because of securities fraud, so the risk of fraud cannot be diversified away. See Booth. The
End of the Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 3, at 14 & n.35.
183. See Booth, Class Conflict, supra note 7, at 702, 760.
184. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
186. To be sure, feedback is a problem only for holders: although feedback increases the loss
for buyers, buyers recover for this loss. at least in theory. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying
text. In other words, feedback, in the aggregate, is equal to the amount that holders pay buyers, so
feedback loss falls solely on holders. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. On the other
hand, if aggregate recovery is merely equal to feedback loss-which, by definition, it must be at a
minimum--even buyers may be worse off to the extent of fees and expenses. See supra notes 11-
13 and accompanying text. In any event, one could argue that since feedback falls solely on holders
who have no standing to sue, it should be ignored for purposes of assessing superiority. But it is
difficult to believe that the courts would or should ignore the obvious consequences of a decision to
certify a class action, once the effects are explained as they are herein. Indeed, since feedback is a
cost of fraud suffered by the corporation because of a class action triggered by securities fraud, it
should give rise to a subsequent derivative claim just as a civil or criminal penalty would. See, e.g.,
In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 273, 278 79 (D.N.J. 2000) (noting that the
derivative plaintiff would always have a subsequent claim for any improvident settlement to which
the defendant corporation might agree in a class action), affd, 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001). Thus,
in deciding whether to certify. a court should consider the fact that a class action may-indeed
should-give rise to ain additional derivative claim and, thus, even more litigation. From there, it is
a small step to the idea that if the corporation can recover from the individual wrongdoers, we
should skip the class action and proceed directly to a derivative action. In other words, the court
should address the derivative claim first. Finally. although it should go without saying, a derivative
action also fixes the opt-out problem discussed above. See supra note 145. Since the recovery goes
to the corporation, there is nothing for ain individual stockholder to gain by suing individually. See
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Third, class actions constitute excessive deterrence because plaintiffs can
recover for all of their losses, including the loss that would happen even in the
absence of fraud. 8 As a result, there are too many securities fraud class
actions. 8 Moreover, defendant companies invest too much in prevention and
defense and settle too readily. 189 Although one might argue that we should deter
fraud however we can, the fact is that too much deterrence makes managers
reluctant to speak at all.190 Presumably, investors want as much information as
they can get, and they are willing to accept an occasional mistake if it means
more information. In short, investors dislike fraud but not so much that they
would pay more to prevent it than the fraud actually costs. Thus, a derivative
remedy is perfectly tailored to investor interests. If investors were fully
informed and could vote on the matter, they would presumably choose to abolish
securities fraud class actions in favor of derivative actions.
All of these problems go away if the claim is prosecuted as a derivative
action. 193 To be clear, these are not mere policy considerations. FRCP Rule
23(b)(3) requires that a class action for damages be superior to all other modes of
litigating the claim.19 4 In other words, a class action for damages is reserved for
situations in which there is no alternative. 195 There is simply no doubt that a
derivative action is the superior way to litigate securities fraud arising under
Rule 1Ob-5.
supra note 145. Moreover, there is no right to opt out of a derivative action. The concept itself is
nonsense since the corporation is the real plaintiff. See supra note 145. And even if one conceives
of a derivative action as a FRCP Rule 23(b)(2) class action by the stockholders seeking to compel
the corporation to sue-which it is as discussed further below-there is no right to opt out of a class
action under Rule 23(b)(2). See infra notes 200-10 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
190. Indeed, the Supreme Court has suggested that corporations can avoid the uncertainties of
securities law--such as wlhat constitutes a material statement of fact-by choosing not to speak
when in doubt. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1321 (2011).
191. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52
U. CHI. L. REv. 611, 626 & n.20 (1985).
192. One possible objection is that a plaintiff lawyer will be less motivated to file a derivative
action because of the smaller potential recovery and fee. See supra note 148. The obvious response
is that the incentive to file a class action is larger than it should be. See supra notes 48-49 and
accompanying text. Moreover, the potential recovery in a derivative action is greater than the
derivative portion of a class action claim because, in effect, a derivative claim is asserted on behalf
of all stockholders rather than buyers only, which should please the plaintiffs' bar. See supra notes
45-46 and accompanying text. Thus, the threat of a derivative action is a more significant deterrent
than one might at first think. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
193. See Booth. Class Conflict, supra note 7, at 760.
194. FED. R. Ci. P. 23(b)(3).
195. See id.
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C. Class Certification
Despite their clear superiority, there is an obvious practical problem with the
idea that securities fraud claims should be handled as derivative actions:
presumably, someone must make the argument. Needless to say, the standard
practice is for plaintiffs or their attorneys to file class actions.196 Although it is
common for a derivative action to be filed alongside a class action, such actions
are almost always settled in exchange for nonronetary consideration such as
corporate governance reforms. 197 In other words, derivative action plaintiffs and
their attorneys seem not to be a terribly zealous lot. Rather, they seem content to
play second fiddle to a class action-rather than lead guitar. There are several
possible reasons why this pattern prevails (as discussed further below). But
there would seem to be little that the courts can do when plaintiffs frame their
claims primarily as class action claims. Not so.
First, it is not tip to the parties to seek direct relief when derivative relief is
proper.198 The question of whether an action is derivative or direct is akin to a
question of subject matter jurisdiction: it is one for the court to decide on its own
motion if necessary, regardless of whether the parties raise the issue.199 Indeed,
the court has no choice in the matter.
Second, a court must certify that an action is appropriate to be litigated as a
class action for an action to proceed as such.200 Thus, the court must determine
which one of three permissible types of class actions is appropriate2. Securities
fraud actions are invariably certified as class actions for damages under FRCP
Rule 23(b)(3).20 But Rule 23(b)(2) also permits certification where "the party
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to
the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is
appropriate respecting the class as a whole.i203 That is a perfect description of a
derivative action. A derivative action is an action by a stockholder seeking to
compel the corporation to assert its rights against a wrongdoer.204 Because the
corporation has refused or neglected to act on behalf of its stockholders, it is
appropriate for a representative stockholder to seek what amounts to a
mandatory injunction compelling the corporation to sue the wrongdoers.205
Indeed, derivative actions were historically described as equitable actions
brought on behalf of the stockholders as a class seeking to compel the
196. See 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE. supra note 168, § 7.02.
197. See Booth, Class Coiflict, supra note 7, at 725 26.
198. See id. at 740.
199. See id.: see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C) (allowing for the amendment or alteration of
a class certification order at any time prior to final judgment).
200. See FED. R. Cly. P. 23(c)(1).
201. See FED. R. Cly. P. 23(b)-(c).
202. See Booth. Derivative Claims, supra note 170. at 309.
203. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
204. See FED. R. Cy. P. 23. 1 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 509 (9th ed. 2009).
205. See FED. R. Cly.P. 23.1.
2012] 303
39
Booth: Index Funds and Securities Fraud Litigation
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 64: 265
corporation to sue. (Incidentally, this explains why derivative actions are
typically treated as matters of equity.206) To be sure, there is a separate rule that
governs derivative actions: FRCP Rule 23.1. 0 But this does not change the fact
that Rule 23(b)(2) also contemplates such actions.208 Rule 23.1 simply provides
additional detail about how derivative actions must proceed]209 Moreover, the
law is clear that Rule 23(b)(3) is a last resort. An action may be certified
thereunder only if it cannot be certified under any other provision. 0 Thus, it is
clear that a court may recast a securities fraud class action as one seeking
injunctive relief and indeed must do so.
In short, although the plaintiff may try to proceed under one rule or the
other, it is ultimately tip to the court to decide how to manage the action.
After all, both class actions and derivative actions are representative actions.212
They do not belong to the plaintiff. Rather, the plaintiff is a fiduciary for the
213class or the corporation. Witness the fact that in neither case may the action
be dismissed or settled without the approval of the court.214
To be sure, it is not clear that a derivative action of the type contemplated
here may be tried in federal court because the corporation is neither a buyer nor a
seller and may not have standing to sue tinder Rule lOb-5.215 But neither is it
clear that the purchaser-seller rule applies to a derivative action. Indeed, there
are good reasons to believe that it does not. For example, section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) expressly contemplates a derivative
action to recover gains from short-swing trading. Moreover, although the
206. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011) (citing Armchen Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591. 613 (1997)).
207. See FED. R. Cly. P. 23. 1. It is no coincidence that the rules appear adjacent to each other
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
208. See Booth. Class Conflict, supra note 7, at 755 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)).
209. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
210. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
211. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2562
(2011) (citing BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1366 (9th ed. 2009)) (demonstrating that courts
ultimately decide whether to allow class certification).
212. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1417 (9th ed. 2009).
213. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
214. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e); Zapata Corp v. Maldonado. 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981).
215. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. Although there may be some cases in which
the company itself was a purchaser or seller of its own stock, most securities fraud class actions that
arise under Rule lOb-5 involve no trading at all by the company. See Booth, Class Conflict, supra
note 7, at 703 n.1L Again, the focus here is on claims relating to trading in outstanding shares.
Claims arising under the 1933 Act are fundamentally different. See id. There, it is perfectly proper
for buyers to recover against the issuer wvho offered shares under false pretenses. See Booth,
Derivative Claims. supra note 170, at 282. There may also be cases arising under Rule lob-5 in
which the company has bought back shares on the open market or has sold shares other than
pursuant to ain offering under the 1933 Act. See id. at 311-12 & n.66. Again, the company may be
a proper defendant in such cases. See id But the focus here is on cases arising as a result of
misrepresentations or actionable omissions to speak, on which buyers and sellers of outstanding
stock rely in connection with trades not involving the issuer corporation.
216. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006).
304
40
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 2 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss2/3
INDEX FUNDS AND SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA)217 requires that direct
class actions based on a theory of nondisclosure arising tinder state law be
removed to federal court218 and thus dismissed if brought on behalf of
holders-the so-called Delaware carve-out thereto expressly exempts derivative
actions.219 Thus, it is quite clear that such claims may be asserted in state court
and are not preempted by federal law.220 To be sure, a federal court might be
required to dismiss such a derivative action if it finds that the corporation has no
standing to sue tinder federal law. Although that outcome seems unlikely given
that the 1934 Act expressly contemplates derivative actions under section 16(b),
such an action may always be heard in state court.
D. Remaining Direct Claims
The question remains as to how the direct claims of buyers should be
handled once a derivative action has been settled. In other words, after the
derivative portion of the claim is settled, buyers are still left with shares that
have declined in value because of the bad news. Arguably, they should have a
remedy if they bought in reliance on the integrity of the market. There are
several responses to this argument.
First, it is not clear that these losses are the result of fraud. The losses that
flow from lower expected returns and higher expected nonactionable risk will
occur one way or the other, albeit sooner rather than later in the absence of
fraud.22 The derivative losses that flow from reputational harms and
enforcement costs are different in that they are the genuine losses from fraud.
Since these genuine losses are all addressed by a derivative action, investors are
made whole.223 As a group, the stockholders are in the same position as if there
had been no fraud at all. If the corporation recovers, the stockholders are
restored to where they would have been in the absence of fraud.224 Thus, it is not
clear that there is any real claim that remains after the derivative action has been
litigated and settled.225
217. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
218. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(2) (2006).
219. See id. 78bb(f)(3)(A)(i)-(ii); see also Booth, Class Conflict, supra note 7, at 735
("SLUSA expressly preserves state court jurisdiction over derivative actions in a provision
popularly knowvn as the Delaware carve-out.").
220. See, e.g., LaSala v. Bordier et Cie, 519 F.3d 121, 128-129 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing 15
U.S.C. §§ 78bb(t)(1), 78bb(f)(5)(B) (1998)) ("To be preempted by SLUSA ain action must (1) make
use of a procedural vehicle akin to a class action .....
221. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 35 37, 44 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text. It is quite clear that under federal
securities law a plaintiff is limited to recovery of actual losses (also known as out-of-pocket losses
or OOPs). See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77(k)(e) (2006). If the market does not react to ain
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Second, the direct claims of buyers, if any, are reduced by the prior
settlement of the derivative portion thereof.226 In other words, buyers effectively
recover at least a portion of their losses through a derivative action, and although
a derivative recovery is effectively spread over all the stockholders, ' it may
often be as much as a buyer could expect in a direct class action.228 Thus, even
if there is some good reason to compensate investors for losses that would
happen anyway, it makes sense to deal with the derivative losses first, since, by
doing so, the direct claims of buyers are thereby reduced in amount.
Third, any insurance owned by the corporation is likely to be depleted by a
derivative action. Since most securities fraud class actions settle for the
amount of insurance available,230 buyers may not find it worth the candle to
assert direct claims by means of a class action.
Fourth, as a practical matter, feedback would be reintroduced into the system
if buyers were permitted to sue the corporation directly for individual losses
following a class action-thus giving rise to another derivative action. On the
other hand, it is possible that the individual claims of buyers could be litigated as
a supplement to the derivative action-with some amount of the derivative
recovery paid directly to buyers. Although the law frowns on individual
alleged fraud in some way other than to adjust stock price by the same amount as it would have
attained in the absence of fraud, it is difficult to see why there should be any remedy. Indeed, there
is substantial authority that if the market does not react to a corrective disclosure at some point,
there is no claim. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 597
F.3d 330, 336-37 (5th Cir. 2010), vacated sub nom. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131
S. Ct. 2179, 2187 (2011). Similarly, some courts have ruled that if a corrective disclosure does not
move the market price, it cannot be material. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d
1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997). Thus, it is not clear that there is any claim left after the derivative claim
is litigated. If there is no derivative claim, arguably there can be no fraud. If a stock falls in price
merely by ain amount that reflects new information about future prospects- and not by any
additional amount that can be traced to reputational harm or enforcement costs-it is difficult to see
how a plaintiff could prove damages causation. Ironically, some commentators seem to take
precisely the opposite view that the only genuine losses from fraud are the losses that derive from
fundamentals, whereas increases in the cost of capital owing to reputational harm, together with
feedback and other enforcement costs, should be viewed as non-compensable collateral damage that
does not flow from the fraud itself. See, e.g., Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Collateral
Damage and Securities Litigation, 2009 UTAH L. REv. 717, 717 ("We conclude that while collateral
damage can have a material impact on securities prices, declines associated with collateral damage
are not, and should not be, recoverable under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.").
226. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 28 31. In the aggregate, average recovery is only about 3% of the loss
claimed, but that 3% has totaled to about $64 billion since 1996. See supra note 11.
229. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence
from the Directors' & Officers'Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 487-89 (2007).
230. See id. at 487-88.
231. See supra note 145.
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recovery, there is nothing to prevent a corporation from using a portion of its
recovery to buy back a few shares from buyers at a premium.232
Finally, policy considerations militate against affording any remedy for
buyers following a derivative action, at least as against the corporation. Again,
diversified investors are indifferent to losses other than derivative losses because
they wash out over time. Since the vast majority of investors are well-
diversified, there is an inherent conflict between diversified and undiversified
investors. Assuming that securities law should be based on the interests of
reasonable investors, it seems clear that the interests of diversified investors
should trump those of undiversified investors.234
Aside from deterrence, some commentators have suggested that it is
important to provide a remedy for undiversified stock-picking investors because
they perform a vital price discovery service for the remainder of the market. For
example, Jill Fisch has argued that securities fraud class actions should be seen
as designed to protect undiversified investors who invest in research and who
ultimately make the market as efficient as it is. As she states:
Passive diversified investing may be a rational strategy for a
particular investor, but this strategy is devastating for the market as a
whole. Investors will not acquire information unless they have the
opportunity to profit on that information by trading. More specifically,
for an investor to benefit from firm-specific research, the potential profit
from that research must exceed the costs of research and analysis. Thus,
informed trading requires investors to limit their diversification and
concentrate their holdings in a limited number of issuers. Indexed
investors, in contrast, seriously threaten market efficiency.
As a result, informed traders are a critical component of the market
that enables mandated disclosure to serve as a corporate-governance
mechanism. Yet, informed traders incur costs that are not borne by
other investors. They incur the costs of research. They incur the
reduced liquidity and increased risk associated with limiting their
232. See Park, supra note 31, at 339.
233. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Moreover, even undiversified long-term
holders will tend to lose more often than they gain and thus would likely oppose a class action
remiedy as long as there is a derivative remedy. See snpra note 10 and accompanying text. Again,
investors assume the risk of mispricing and can hedge it away if they choose to do so. See supra
note 26 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
235. Fisch, supra note 23, at 346-47; see also Booth, The Buzzard Was Their Friend, supra
note 96, at 901 (arguing that securities fraud class actions serve as ain insurance policy against some
types of losses for undiversified investors). One might even argue that index tund investors are
neither real investors nor are they among the class of investors that are intended to be protected by
the federal securities laws. Cf Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel. 439 U.S. 551, 563-64 (1979)
(finding that Congress did not intend for non-contributory pension plan benefits to come within the
coverage of the 1933 and 1934 Acts).
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diversification. And they incur, disproportionately, the costs of
securities fraud because. relying on firm-specific disclosure to trade.
they are more likely than diversified investors to be net losers.236
Nevertheless, Fisch recognizes that diversified investors enjoy a windfall under
the current scheme2. Accordingly, she suggests that some sort of limitation on
the fraud on the market presumption might be appropriate. 2 Although it is not
clear that undiversified stock-picking investors (such as hedge funds) need any
remedy to encourage them to continue to do what they do-let alone a remedy
that comes at the expense of diversified buy-and-hold investors-there is no
reason that an individual buyer cannot file suit tinder Rule 1Ob-5 if the buyer has
in fact detrimentally relied on some misrepresentation by an issuer.239 To be
sure, an individual investor who recovers from an issuer does so at the expense
of other stockholders,240 and that may motivate other stockholders to sue. But
there will always be a substantial number of stockholders who would or should
oppose a class action and favor a derivative action. And since a derivative
action should take precedence over any direct action by individual stockholders
and dispose of a portion of an direct claim, there may be little left for direct
claimants to sue about anyway.
V. MARKET FAILURE AND THE SURVIVAL OF CLASS ACTIONS
Given the almost universal disdain for securities fraud class actions and the
obvious superiority of derivative actions, it is curious that no one appears to have
argued that a derivative action should trump a class action and that the
corporation should recover real money from the individual wrongdoers. It is all
the more curious since the amount at stake could be relatively significant in that
236. Fisch, supra note 23, at 346-47.
237. See id. at 348.
238. Id. at 348-49.
239. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
240. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. This is essentially the situation that occurs
when big investors opt out of a class action in an effort to maximize their individual recovery. See
supra note 145. To be sure, a class member always has the right to opt out and go it alone, but the
courts often preclude such opportunism, as a matter of corporation law, by recasting the action as
derivative, effectively forcing all stockholders to opt in to the action. See supra note 145. In other
words, there is substantial case authority that a claim that can be asserted derivatively must be
asserted derivatively. See supra note 145.
241. See supra Parts I, II.
242. See supra notes 158 59 and accompanying text. It is unlikely that any direct claim
would succeed where a derivative claim has failed. Moreover, a stock-picking value investor- such
as a hedge fund--presumably understands the additional risk it assumes by declining to diversify
and factors that additional risk into its investment strategy. See supra note 26 and accompanying
text. To afford such ain investor a remedy for simple mispricing is to subsidize such activities for no
apparent reason.
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it equals the loss suffered by all holders-not only buyers.243 Thus, the incentive
for an enterprising plaintiff lawyer to prosecute a derivative action should often
be quite substantial. 44
A. The Role ofDirectors' and Officers'Insurance
The most likely explanation for the survival of class actions as the dominant
mode of private securities litigation is that directors' and officers' (D&O)
insurance does not cover (successful) derivative actions.245 Again, class actions
typically settle for the amount of insurance funds available.246 Arguably, if there
is no insurance, there is no incentive to sue.247
D&O insurance typically comes in three flavors. So-called Side A
coverage insures individual managers against liability to stockholders. 49
Typically, it applies only when the corporation cannot indemnify and thus
requires the corporation to indemnify if legally permissible.2o Side B coverage
251
insures the corporation against indemnification payments2. Side C coverage
insures the corporation against liability to stockholders. 2  The obvious gap in
this scheme is that nothing covers the directors and officers for liability to the
corporation. Moreover, even if such coverage were available, D&O insurance
typically excludes claims for fraud or personal enrichment.253 It also excludes
insured-against-insured claims.254 Thus, although a corporation is free to buy
243. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
244. To be sure, a shift to a derivative remedy would eliminate feedback losses. See supra
note 158 and accompanying text. So the incentive to sue would not be as substantial as one might at
first think. On the other hand, the plaintiff attorney's fee might be augmented in recognition of the
elimination of feedback and the concomitant savings enjoyed by the corporation, at least in the first
few such cases. The few cases in whrich derivative plaintiffs have asserted their claims with any
vigor seem to be based more on worries about how such claims might be compromised by
settlement of the class claim. See in re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 235, 246 (D.N.J.
2000), affd, 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001). On the other hand, the prospect of a derivative action
might cause the market to react less to securities fraud in the first place. Although that might be
unfortunate for plaintiff attorneys, it is hard to see how anything that would make the market less
volatile could be bad.
245. See Baker & Griffith, supra note 229, at 498 n.49.
246. Id at 487-88.
247. Clearly, this cannot literally be true. If it were, then the best defense for a potential target
corporation would be to eschew insurance altogether and go naked. Moreover, a corporation is the
ultimate deep pocket. So there is no reason to think that in the absence of insurance, there would be
no securities litigation. Thus, it is really quite curious that so many cases settle for whatever
insurance is available.
248. Id at 499.
249. Id
250. Id. at 499 n.51.
251. Id. at 499.
252. Id
253. Id at 500.
254. Id. One obvious question is why D&O insurance affords any coverage in a securities
fraud action, given the exclusion for fraud. The answer may be that the exclusion does not apply if
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any insurance that is available--even in situations in which the corporation
would be precluded from indemnifying the individual defendant-apparently
insurance that covers the corporation for losses at the hands of its officers and
directors-or that covers officers and directors for such liability-is not readily
available. 255
The bottom line is that even though the potential damages in a derivative
action may be quite substantial, the chances that the individual wrongdoers will
be able to pay any significant amount are quite slim.256 Thus, plaintiff lawyers
have no incentive to pursue a derivative remedy-at least not to the exclusion of
a class action remedy.2
On the other hand, the fact that individual wrongdoers may not be able to
pay does not necessarily mean that the lawyer for the derivative plaintiff cannot
be paid and paid well. In a derivative action, it is the corporation that pays the
attorney fees, typically in proportion to the benefit conferred on it by the
derivative action. The problem is that much of the benefit of a derivative
action may be hidden from view in that it consists of avoiding the loss to the
corporation that would result from a payout to the plaintiff class-feedback
loss.m So it may be appropriate to compensate the plaintiff lawyer in a
derivative action with a relatively large portion of any recovery, or even to have
the corporation pay out of its own pocket. Still, this argument is likely to work
only in the first few cases since the market may come to expect derivative
recovery.
the case is settled. Cf Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138, 143 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1974) (permitting indemnification of director officer who pleaded no contest to criminal
charges), superseded by statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 145 (2011), as recognized in Mass. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwvriters at Lloyd's of London, C.A. No. 4791-VCL, 2010 WL
3724745 (Del. Ch. 2010). Or it may be that the fraud exclusion applies only to fraud as traditionally
defined. where the insured has sought to secure a benefit for someone by false pretenses. See
BLACK S L Aw DICTIONARY 731 (9th ed. 2009). Finally, although an insurance company might
argue that securities fraud is not covered, that would seemingly preclude the sale of such insurance,
which presumably generates profits for the insurance company.
255. Corporation law prohibits the corporation from indemnifying directors and officers if
they are found liable to the corporation. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.51(d), 8.57 (2010). It is
also impermissible for the certificate of incorporation to absolve directors or officers for a breach of
the duty of good faith. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011).
256. See Booth. Derivative Claims, supra note 170. at 302.
257. This is not to suggest that derivative actions are anomalous under current law. The threat
that the stockholders might seriously prosecute a derivative action for real money against individual
wrongdoers may add to the pressure to settle, precisely because the individual defendants would be
required to pay out of their ovn pockets. So it is easy to see why derivative actions continue to be
filed alongside class actions. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
258. See Booth, Derivative Clains, supra note 170, at 324. The theory is that the corporation
should pay because all of the stockholders benefit from the recovery in a derivative action in
proportion to their stockholdings. See 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 168,
§ 7.17.
259. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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Thus, it is at least understandable why plaintiff lawyers may prefer the status
quo to a derivative regime. There is little doubt that aggregate attorney fees are
60likely to be greater in a class action than in a derivative action -possibly great
enough that the share that goes to the plaintiff lawyer in a tag-along derivative
action may be even more than might be expected from a stand-alone derivative
action.
Ultimately, these problems are temporary. Once the shift from class action
to derivative action has been accomplished, there is no doubt that insurance
companies will come forward with products designed to protect directors and
26 1officers from liability to the corporation.
B. Other Unindicted Co-Conspirators
The foregoing story does not explain why insurance companies do not object
to covering claims that should not be covered tinder existing policies as written,
given that a substantial portion of any meritorious claim should be treated as
derivative.262 The cynical answer to this question is that insurance companies
can sell bigger policies if they cover class action claims. Although the insurance
company might save a bit on claims it denies, it would likely lose much more in
future sales. A somewhat less cynical answer is that it might be fraudulent for an
insurance company to sell a policy that covers a defendant company for class
action damages or settlements and then to argue that the loss suffered by the
260. See Booth, Derivative Clains, supra note 170, at 279.
261. There are many examples of such creativity on the part of insurance companies. For
example, American International Group (AIG), of all companies, recently announced a new form of
insurance called ReputationGuard that will provide coverage for damage control in the event of
scandal. See Erik Holm, Got a Crisis? Tap AIG (Really), WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2011, at Cl; see
also Disgrace Insurance Tailored for Celebrity Pitchinen (NPR radio broadcast Nov. 22, 2010).
available at litp://www.npr.org/2010/11/22/131504268/the-last-word-in-business (describing insurance
that covers a company for the cost of ain advertising campaign that must be scrapped because it
features a celebrity who has misbehaved-like Tiger Woods). Such coverage is not far removed in
concept from coverage for ain increase in the cost of capital as a result of securities fraud by
directors and officers. See Richard A. Booth, Reducing Risk Doesn't Pay Off WALL ST. J., Mar.
15, 1999, at Al8 (criticizing the idea of corporations buying insurance against decreased earnings).
To be sure, there will be issues to be ironed out in defining any new form of insurance that might be
sold to cover directors and officers for liability to the corporation, but these issues are really no
different from the issues that arise in writing D&O policies under the current legal regime. See
generally Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith. How the Merits Matter: Directors' and Officers 'Insurance
and Securities Settlenents, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 755, 804 (2009) (exploring issues that occur in
issuing D&O insurance); Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate
Disclosure ofDetails Concerning Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, 154 U. PA.
L. REv. 1147. 1196 (2006) (exploring the issues that occur in issuing D&O insurance). Incidentally,
if derivative actions do come to displace class actions-as they should-and if a new form of D&O
insurance thus comes to be written, directors and officers should arguably pay for it. Needless to
say, management would likely demand more compensation as a result, so the corporation may end
up paying either way, but as long as the cost is treated as compensation expense, it seems safe to
leave regulation to the market.
262. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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insured should have been treated as a derivative claim, thus exposing directors
and officers to personal liability. In any event, it is difficult to fault insurance
companies for writing coverage consistent with existing law.
Needless to say, directors and officers have no incentive to argue in favor of
a derivative action. Aside from being disinclined to urge the corporation to sue
themselves, a class action permits the cor oration and management to circle the
wagons and present a united defense. Moreover, by eliminating issues
relating to individual wrongdoing, the defense can avoid much of the discovery
and expense that goes therewith.
Finally, although the courts could rule on their own motion that class claims
should be recharacterized as derivative claims, at least in part,6 they have not
done so. The easy answer as to why not---offered by a very thoughtful federal
district court judge-is that no one has made the argument-at least not to
263. Note that the failure of management to argue-against interest-for a derivative action
could be seen as a breach of fiduciary duty. Management has a duty to act in the best interest of the
corporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011) (stating that directors owe a duty
of loyalty to the corporation and its stockholders). By neglecting to assert that the action should be
prosecuted derivatively, or by the corporation itself, management arguably foists its owvn potential
liability onto the corporation because, under existing law, the corporation can be held liable for the
entire decline in stock price. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. It is akin to burning down a
house to cover up a robbery. One might even liken it to the corporate income tax, which has been
said to cost more in compliance than it raises in revenue.
264. Again, this may disserve the corporation by permitting the plaintiff to impute to the
corporation all of the knowledge and actions of individual directors and officers even though no one
of them alone might have had the requisite scienter to support a claim. See, e.g., City of Monroe
Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651. 656-58, 690-91 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming the
dismissal of claims against the individual defendants as directors and officers of a corporation, but
nonetheless holding that the facts supported scienter for corporate defendants where the corporation
engaged in a variety of tactics to keep the scope of a safety problem hidden from safety regulators).
The question whether an individual actor must have acted with scienter, or at least have had the
requisite knowledge and authority, has only recently come to the fore. See, e.g., City of Roseville
Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Horizon Lines, Inc., 442 F. App'x 672, 676 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing plaintiffs
contention that it may plead scienter against the corporation without successfully pleading a claim
against any individual). It is interesting that this question has never been settled, even though it
came up very early in the evolution of securities litigation under Rule 1Ob-5, albeit before it was
clear that scienter was required. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir.
1968) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(a)(2). 77q(a)(2}-(3) (2006): Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 272
(2d Cir. 1967); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 9 F.R.D. 707, 710-11 (S.D.NY. 1949), rev'd, 188
F.2d 783, 789 (2d Cir. 1951)). It may also be that worries about how to identify individual
wrongdoers has discouraged the development of a derivative remedy. Indeed, this has been an
obstacle in efforts to recover from individuals in class actions. In contrast, the idea that the
corporation is liable for the acts of its directors and officers avoids this problem by ignoring it. As a
matter of corporation law, the board of directors is viewed as a single unit for purposes of liability,
at least in the absence of formal objection by one or more individual members. See MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT 8.30 (2010). No such doctrine applies to the officers as a group. On the other hand,
insurance against derivative liability could fix the problem of who is responsible by covering the
directors and officers as a group. See supra note 256 and accompanying text. Indeed, the law is
clear that a corporation is free to buy whatever insurance it can obtain, even if the coverage offered
exceeds the permissible scope of indemnification. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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h266him. Although it is not a complete answer, it is a pretty good answer.
Moreover, one can hardly fault a judge-or anyone else-for failure to ideate.
Although it may seem obvious-once the argument is laid out as it is here-that
derivative claims are imbedded within class claims, there is a first time for
everything.
C. Other Factors
There are numerous other factors that tend to muddle thinking on the proper
characterization of securities fraud claims.
One such factor is the weight of history. It may be that no one has
considered the possibility that a cause of action so well established as the direct
class action by buyers for damages can be challenged by private litigants. 6 8
Another closely related factor is that financial recovery by the corporation
seems to be totally at odds with individual recovery from the corporation by
those who bought shares. What would be the sense in recovery both in favor of
the corporation and against the corporation? Needless to say, the problem with
this argument lies in the premise that a remedy against the corporation makes
sense. Nevertheless, given that the direct class action remedy is so well
266. 1 posed this question to Judge Lewis Kaplan following a lecture he delivered on October
29, 2009, at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Judge Lewis Kaplan, Lecture at
University of Pennsylvania Law School (Oct. 29, 2009). But see LaSala v. Bordier et Cie. 519 F.3d
121. 137 (3d Cir. 2008) (concluding that a claim remained derivative despite having been assigned
to plaintiff class).
267. For example, before 1976, no one seems to have thought of the possibility that a
corporation could seek dismissal of a derivative action in wv hich its own directors were named as the
defendants. See Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see also Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 781 (Del. 1981) (citing Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d
724 (8th Cir. 1979): Lewis v. Adams. No. 77-266C (N.D. Okla. Nov. 15, 1979); Siegal v. Merrick,
84 F.R.D. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd in
part, revd in part, 671 F.2d 729, 732 (2d Cir. 1982)) (addressing the split among federal courts on
whether the business judgment rule "enables boards ... to terminate derivative suits"); Auerbach v.
Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979) ("Derivative claims against corporate directors belong
to the corporation itself. . .. the decision whether and to what extent to explore and prosecute such
claims lies within the judgment and control of the corporation's board of directors."). Moreover,
the argument that class claims are, in fact, derivative is based on an understanding of both finance
and civil procedure that is not likely in the wheelhouse of many.
268. It is easy enough to see how a cause of action evolved under Rule IOb-5 at a time when
most investors were undiversified. Since investors who buy new shares in an offering may sue
under the 1933 Act, see supra note 2, it must have seemed terribly unfair that those wlho buy shares
on the open market during the offering have no remedy unless they can somehow trace the shares
they bought to the offering. See Richard A. Booth, [he Missing Link Betwf een Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud, 2 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 185, 194 (2007). Thus, it is understandable how the courts
were persuaded to imply a remedy under Rule 1Ob-5. Although the rationale behind the 1933 Act's
remedy of disgorgement of funds raised under false pretenses does not apply unless the company
itself has sold shares, see id, it is easy enough to see how the courts might imply a remedy under
Rule 1Ob-5 if they are focused instead on investor protection.
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established, it takes a radical rethinking of the legal regime-such as set forth
here-to see the sense in recovery of money damages by the corporation.269
Yet another factor is that there may be doubt about how to proceed in federal
court and indeed whether the corporation even has standing to sue under Rule
1Ob-5. 270 While a derivative action may be heard pursuant to the court's
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims arising from the same facts as a
Rule lOb-5 action on behalf of a buyer class,271 it is not so clear that a federal
court may hear a stand-alone derivative action or exercise supplemental
jurisdiction if the derivative action is treated as the main event and the direct
272class action is treated as incidental thereto. Since the corporation is typically
neither a buyer nor seller of its own stock in situations giving rise to class
actions, it could be argued under Blue Chip Stamps that the corporation has no
standing to sue and that a derivative action should therefore be dismissed to the
extent that it is based on a theory of fraud under federal securities law.2
Indeed, the possibility of sanctions under FRCP Rule 11 may deter some lawyers
from making many of the arguments proposed here.274
269. It has also been suggested that federal law may have preempted state law as it relates to
issues of disclosure, but the weight of authority seems to be to the contrary. See Pfeiffer v. Toll.
989 A.2d 683, 701 02 (Del. Ch. 2010) (rejecting the argument that the federal insider trading
regime lea-ves no room for a state corporate remedy), abrogated on other grounds by Kahn v.
Kolberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 23 A.3d 831 (Del. 2011).
270. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
271. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006).
272. See Booth, Derivative Claims, supra note 170, at 316 & n.81.
273. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
274. See Booth. Derivative Claims, supra note 170, at 323-24 & n.97. There may be cases in
which the issuer corporation has either sold or bought stock in connection with the fraud, aside from
cases arising under the 1933 Act. In such cases, it may be appropriate for the corporation to be
liable to the extent of any gain enjoyed by the corporation. But the focus here is on securities fraud
claims that do not depend on any trading by the corporation. One interesting (and likely) possibility
is that the defendant corporation itself may have repurchased shares during the class period, for
example, in order to offset a grant of stock options. Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class
Action, snpra note 3. at 29 n.81. If so, the corporation itself may be a member of the plaintiff class.
See id. (citing United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 661-62 (1997)). On the other hand, it
seems unlikely in any meritorious case that the corporation would have bought overpriced shares,
since it is ultimately up to management to order a repurchase. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc.
S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 136-37 (Del. Ch. 2009) (involving claim that corporation
repurchased overpriced shares). To be sure, a corporation might be tempted to sell shares under
such circumstances, but corporations seldom sell shares to the general public outside the scope of
the 1933 Act. See snpra note 215. Needless to say. the situation is different in a good-news case,
where it is entirely possible that the corporation may purchase shares possibly on autopilot-in
advance of a release of good news. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847 (2d
Cir. 1968) (involving claim against defendants wlho purchased shares in between the corporation's
discovery of "good news" and its official and full public disclosure of that news). If so, it may be
appropriate for the corporation to disgorge its gains. See supra note 2. But since good-news cases
are quite rare, so too is this situation. See supra note 29.
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Needless to say, a derivative action can always be pursued in state court,275
but it is not clear that a federal court would defer to a state court.276 If anything,
the state court would likely defer. Or the derivative action might be removed
to federal court if only for purposes of settlement. Either way, we are back
where we started with the class action taking precedence over the derivative
action.
Although the Blue Chip Stamps doctrine is somewhat worrisome, there is
good reason to think that it should not apply in connection with a derivative
action. 8
First, section 16(b) of the 1934 Act expressly contemplates derivative
actions in the case of short-swing trading, even though the corporation is neither
a buyer nor a seller of its own stock.279 While this section applies narrowly to
permit the corporation to force disgorgement of short-swing profits by statutory
280insiders, it must be kept in mind that the right of buyers to sue inder Rule
lOb-5 is a judicially implied cause of action subject to judicially imposed
limitations on standing. 81 In contrast, section 16(b) is an express cause of action
running to the issuer corporation in circumstances in which the corporation
neither buys nor sells its own stock. 82  This would seem to be a rather strong
indication that if there is a private cause of action under Rule 1 Ob-5, an issuer
corporation should be able to assert it in the context of a derivative action.m
Moreover, Congress was quite careful to preserve derivative actions by
exempting them from preemption or mandatory removal under SLUSA. 2'
Indeed, SLUSA defines a covered cause of action in the same terms used by the
Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps-a class action based on a
misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.2
275. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
276. See Booth, Class Conflict, supra note 7., at 725 & n.48.
277. Compare Brenner v. Albrecht. No. 6514 VCP, 2012 WL 252286, at *6-7 (Del. Ch. Jan.
27, 2012) (granting stay on theory that derivative recovery depends on loss fi-om class action) with
Pfeiffer v. Toll, 989 A.2d 683, 695 708 (Del. Ch. 2010) (emphasizing consistency and
interdependence but differing goals of state and federal law and advocating coordination with
federal action rather than deference), abrogated on other grounds by Kahn v. Kolberg Kravis
Roberts & Co., 23 A.3d 831 (Del. 2011). See also In re Massey Energy Co., No. 5430 VCS, 2011
WL 2176479, at *20 21 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011) (discussing likelihood of success of derivative
action in such circumstances).
278. See Booth. Derivative Claims. supra note 170, at 312-13 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975)).
279. See id. at 313.
280. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006).
281. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71. 80 (2006) (citing
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)).
282. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
285. See Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82-84 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(t)(1)(A)-(B) (2006); Blue Chip
Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737, 749).
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Second, Rule 10b-5 largely depends on state law fiduciary duties running to
the issuer corporation for purposes of determining whether there is a duty to
disclose.286 For example, under the prevailing misappropriation theory, a seller
of stock who has knowledge of material nonpublic information indicating that it
is overpriced is guilty of insider trading only if that seller owes a duty to the
source of the information-typ ically the issuer corporation-not to use the
information for personal gain. Thus, the courts have held that an open-market
buyer of overpriced stock has no implied claim against a seller since the seller's
breach, if any, is one of a duty running to the corporation not to use inside
information for personal gain.28 Under these circumstances, it would be quite
odd to say that the corporation has no claim.289
Finally, many observers seem to think that legislation or an SEC rule would
be required to effect any change from the status quo. Accordingly, some
scholars have argued that the SEC should adopt a rule abolishing the implied
cause of action under Rule l0b-5.290 Others have argued for a system in which
the SEC would act as a gatekeeper or supervisor for private securities litigation,
in an effort both to preserve the benefits of private litigation and to curb its
excesses. The essential idea is that a private action would require SEC review
and permission in order to proceed.
Neither of these unlikely steps is necessary.
First, the courts have the power and the responsibility to recharacterize
securities fraud class actions as derivative actions as explained at length
286. See Booth. Class Conflict, supra note 7, at 735.
287. See United States v. O'Htagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (concluding that, under the
misappropriation theory a fiduciary who engages in insider trading defrauds the principal in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities by misappropriatimg the principal's information
for personal gain).
288. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 13. 14. 15 (2d Cir. 1983).
289. As the Supreme Court stated in Dabit, "it is enough that the fraud alleged 'coincide' with
a securities transaction-wxhether by the plaintiff or by someone else." 547 U.S. at 85; see also SEC
v. Zandford. 535 U.S. 813, 820, 822 (2002) ("It is enough that the scheme to defraud and the sale of
securities coincide."); Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int'1 Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588, 594
(2001) (flaming the Rule lob-5 inquiry around whether the fraud "amounted to a
misrepresentation ... in connection with the sale of the option"); Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (stating that where fraud was used in connection
with a sale of a security, there is redress under Rule 1Ob-5).
290. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 165, at 75-76: Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying
Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Lais: [he Commission's Authority, 107
IARv. L. REV. 961, 965-66 (1994).
291. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 165, at 166: Fox, Civil Liability and Mlandatory
Disclosure, supra note 23, at 292-94: Fox, Why Civil Liability?, supra note 23, at 320-21; Rose,
supra note 23, at 1354-56; see also Coffee, supra note 12, at 1538 (asserting that the imposition of
significant financial damages is beneficial to the overall goal of deterrence but that those damages
need to be shifted to fall more on the culpable and less on the innocent): Fisch, supra note 23, at
320-21, 339-40, 349-50 (proposing a complete redesign of the civil liability system whereby the
beneficial deterrent effect on disclosure violations is at least as good as the current system but the
damages bear a much closer relation to the actual social harm caused by the violation).
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above.292 Derivative actions afford an elegant solution to many of the problems
that go with class actions. 93 Most important, by limiting recovery to the true
loss suffered by investors, derivative actions eliminate the excess incentive to
sue and the excess deterrence that goes with it.294 In other words, derivative
actions provide optimal deterrence against securities fraud.295
Second, as noted above, a derivative action will lie whenever a class action
can survive a motion to dismiss.296 In both cases, the action will proceed if and
only if the plaintiff can show scienter.297 While there may be subtle variations in
the way federal and state courts define scienter-as there are in federal court
anyway-the universe of cases in which a class action may be maintained is
essentially congruent with that in which a derivative action may be
maintained 98
Third, derivative actions are superior to the alternative of supervised private
securities litigation because they avoid the need for the SEC to choose which
cases will proceed and the politics that inevitably would go with such
administrative discretion. In a regime based on derivative actions, the market
would decide on the cases to file based solely on the merits-the likelihood of
success-as a measure of potential recovery that is consistent with the true loss
suffered by investors.
D. Index Funds
The ultimate question-the proverbial elephant in the room-is why index
funds have failed to oppose securities fraud class actions and to advocate for a
derivative remedy.
One possible explanation is that, up until now, no one has connected the dots
as set forth herein. In other words, it may be that no one has noticed that a
portion of the typical class claim is actually derivative, rather than direct. It is
also possible that no one has noticed the cost. While it is difficult not to notice a
big settlement check, it may not be so clear how the prospect of litigation might
have enhanced the loss upfront by even more than the amount recovered.299
292. See supra Part IV.
293. See supra Part IV.
294. See supra notes 47 50 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 170.
298. Again, there is no reason to worry about the possibility of voluntary dismissal by the
corporation since the business judgment rule does not protect a breach of the duty of candor made
with scienter. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. In other words, whenever there is a
meritorious claim under Rule 1Ob-5, there will be a meritorious claim for a breach of state law
fiduciary duties by the individual wrongdoers. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
299. Moreover, the loss from feedback presumably happens immediately upon corrective
disclosure. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. Thus, ain index fund manager might view the
loss as so much water under the bridge and reason that it makes sense to seek whatever recovery
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It is also possible that funds worry that in the absence of securities fraud
class actions, there might be so much more securities fraud that investors would
be worse off 00 Indeed, as noted above, legal scholars generally agree that class
actions make little sense as a compensation scheme but that they serve an
important deterrence function.'ot So index fund managers might reckon that
there may be some value in the deterrent effect of securities fraud litigation even
though the cost is borne disproportionately by index fund investors.302 While
altruism may be nice, it does not seem likely that fund managers would
knowingly sacrifice return for the benefit of investors who follow inferior
strategies. Even if they did, fund holders would presumably object that it
constitutes a breach of fund managers' fidciary duty to fund investors. 0 4
It is also possible that index funds have considered the matter and concluded
that there is nothing that can be done to avoid the costs associated with recovery
by other investors, but it is difficult to believe that no index fund appears to have
made any effort to oppose securities fraud class actions. Thus, in the end, the
most likely explanation would seem to be that index funds simply do not
appreciate the costs associated with class actions.30 s
Finally, and perhaps most likely, some funds may be reluctant to take the
lead-irrespective of the form of the action-for fear of offending important
customers. For example, a fund adviser might worry that a defendant company
would eliminate the fund as a choice in its menu of options for employee
retirement plans. Or, it may be that fund advisers might lose other business in
connection with investment management for defendant companies. Or a
might be available. Needless to say, this does not change the fact that the loss is the result of a
payout by the defendant company that would not happen but for the class action. See supra notes
9-10 and accompanying text. Moreover, if the court refuses to certify the class, market price will
presumably rebound to reflect the fact that the feedback loss did not come to pass as expected. See
supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. If the loss can thus be recouped, it makes sense to oppose
class certification. Still, a big settlement check is a bird-in-hand.
300. See supra note 12.
301. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 7, 19 and accompanying text.
303. See HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 20, at 36 (asserting that "rational investors
diversify").
304. On the other hand, fund managers might figure that diversified investors should be
indifferent to securities fraud anyway and should thus view any recovery at all as gravy, which
would also preserve wshatever beneficial deterrent effect may go with class actions. The fallacy, as
noted above, is that enforcement and reputation losses cause stock prices to fall further than they
otherwise would fall, thus dragging down the average return enjoyed by diversified investors. See
supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text. In other words, a diversified investor is indifferent only
to losses that cannot be prevented. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. Moreover, given
attorney fees and other litigation expenses, the recovery from a class action can never make up for
the loss generated by the class action itself. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Thus, the
idea that a diversified investor is indifferent to securities fraud is total double-think.
305. The same goes for index fund investors. If fund investors understood the costs,
presumably someone would have filed a derivative action against his fund to compel the tud to
protect investor interests.
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managed fund might lose access to information about defendant companies. On
the other hand, fund managers might choose initial cases involving companies
that are likely to fail as a result and that offer little prospect of other investment
management business anyway.306 Indeed, it appears that fund managers often
opt out in such cases and pursue individual remedies precisely because there is
no apparent downside.307 Presumably, it would take only a few such derivative
actions to prompt the plaintiff bar to follow the lead. So it is not clear that a fund
manager would need to risk much to get the ball rolling. Moreover, and more
important, it is the right thing to do to serve fund investor interests. 308
VI. CONCLUSION
Most legal scholars agree that securities fraud class actions do little to
compensate investors. First, diversified investors are indifferent to the normal
ups and downs of stock prices. Second, since the defendant company funds the
settlement in a successful class action, holders effectively pay buyers. So stock
price falls by an additional amount when a fraud is discovered to reflect not only
the fraud but also the anticipated payment in a class action. Despite the inherent
circularity, class actions survive, in part because the cost to holders is hidden
while the benefit-a big settlement check-is quite visible. Since a diversified
fund investor is almost always also a holder in any case in which it is a buyer, it
suffers a bigger initial loss because of the class action remedy.
In this Article, I describe a method by which one can measure the net effect
of class actions on fund investors who are both buyers and holders of a fraud-
affected stock. As it turns out, index funds almost always lose more than they
gain. Thus, securities fraud class actions systematically penalize rational
investors for the benefit of undiversified stock-picking investors who happen to
buy during the fraud period. Accordingly, index funds should oppose securities
fraud class actions as contrary to the best interests of fund investors.
306. Moreover, there are some funds that need not worry about offending potential customers
for investment management and pension services-for example, TTAA-CREF comes immediately
to mind. See, e.g., Kevin LaCroix, Are Securities Class Action Opt-Out Actions Back?, D&O
DIARY (Aug. 1, 2011. 4:06 AM), http://www.dandodiary.com/201 1/08/articles/optouts/are-securities-
class-action-optout-actions-back/ (discussing numerous investment management and pension
services opting out ofa large securities class action lawsuits and specifically listing TIAA-CREF as
a large institutional investor that opted out of a large class action lawsuit). In addition, state, local,
and union pension funds would seem to be likely candidates, although they may be more inclined to
make political hay by suing corporations. See, e.g., id. (listing several state and local pension funds
opting out of a large class action lawsuit). It will be interesting to see if such funds become less
active in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm 'n. 130
S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
307. See, e.g., LaCroix, supra note 306 (remarking on the increased prevalence of securities
class action opt outs and discussing a particular securities fraud class action lawsuit where
investment funds opted out under the impression that they would recover more than they would if
they remained in the class).
308. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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One possible problem is that in the absence of the deterrent effect of private
securities litigation, there might be more securities fraud and investors might be
worse off. The answer is that whenever there is a meritorious class claim, the
corporation itself will also have a claim against the individual wrongdoers who
perpetrated the fraud. Although the corporation's claim is limited to the costs of
litigation and any increase in its cost of capital resulting from reputational harm,
the claim is quite substantial from the point of view of individual defendants and
thus constitutes a significant deterrent. In a class action, these elements of loss
are imbedded in the decrease in price that occurs when the fraud is discovered.
But these losses are suffered by the corporation-all of the stockholders-and
thus should be the subject of a derivative action for the benefit of the
corporation, not a class action for the benefit only of those who bought during
the fraud period. Not only is feedback loss eliminated, but the corporation is
also restored in value to the extent of any recovery.
The clear implication is that index funds should oppose securities fraud class
actions and favor derivative actions. Indeed, index funds owe a duty to their
investors to do so. Happily, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a
solution. No action may proceed as a class action unless the court certifies it as a
proper class action, and no action may be so certified if there is a better way to
litigate the issues. The law is clear that a claim that can be handled as a
derivative claim must be handled as a derivative claim. The only problem is that
someone must make the argument.
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APPENDIX: SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS BY YEAR
Year Number of Filings Foreign DDL $B Settle # Settle SM
1996 Ill 6 14
1997 174 6 42 14 150
1998 242 18 80 29 444
1999 209 10 140 65 1123
2000 216 12 250 90 4701
2001 180 14 198 95 2108
2002 224 21 201 Ill 3008
2003 192 16 77 94 2693
2004 228 27 144 110 3626
2005 182 25 93 119 10182
2006 119 13 52 90 18603
2007 177 29 158 108 7600
2008 223 30 221 97 2798
2009 168 '20 84 101 3793
2010 176 28 72 86 3119
TOTALS 2821 275 1826 1209 63948
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